Merge pull request #115 from aakhter/pr/cod-78-security

feat(security): hook-event auth secret + tunnel password guard

src/config/hook-secret.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Per-instance shared hook secret (COD-54).
+ *
+ * Claude Code hooks POST to `/api/hook-event` with no Basic-Auth credentials,
+ * relying on a localhost bypass in `web/middleware/auth.ts`. That bypass is safe
+ * for loopback-only deploys, but a `cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port`
+ * tunnel proxies internet traffic INTO the loopback origin, so tunneled requests
+ * arrive with `req.ip === 127.0.0.1` and would otherwise pass the bypass and
+ * drive respawn/Ralph signals unauthenticated.
+ *
+ * To close that hole WITHOUT breaking the loop's own (credential-less) hook
+ * channel, every locally-generated hook command now presents a per-instance
+ * shared secret in the `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header. The middleware requires
+ * a matching secret for the bypass WHEN A TUNNEL IS RUNNING. Tunneled internet
+ * traffic can't know the secret; local hooks (which we generate) do.
+ *
+ * Storage mirrors the VAPID-key pattern in `push-store.ts`: a small file under
+ * the instance data dir (`dataPath('hook-secret')`), read-if-present /
+ * generate-if-missing, stable across restarts. 256 bits of hex.
+ */
+
+import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { getDataDir, dataPath } from './instance.js';
+
+/** HTTP header local hooks use to present the shared secret. */
+export const HOOK_SECRET_HEADER = 'X-Codeman-Hook-Secret';
+
+/** Number of random bytes in the secret (256 bits → 64 hex chars). */
+const SECRET_BYTES = 32;
+
+let cachedSecret: string | null = null;
+
+/**
+ * Return this instance's hook secret, generating and persisting it on first use.
+ * Stable across restarts. Cached in-process after the first read.
+ */
+export function getHookSecret(): string {
+  if (cachedSecret) return cachedSecret;
+
+  const secretFile = dataPath('hook-secret');
+
+  if (existsSync(secretFile)) {
+    try {
+      const raw = readFileSync(secretFile, 'utf-8').trim();
+      if (raw) {
+        cachedSecret = raw;
+        return cachedSecret;
+      }
+      // Empty/whitespace file — fall through and regenerate.
+    } catch {
+      // Unreadable — fall through and regenerate.
+    }
+  }
+
+  const secret = randomBytes(SECRET_BYTES).toString('hex');
+  try {
+    mkdirSync(getDataDir(), { recursive: true });
+    // Owner-only perms — the secret gates the hook bypass.
+    writeFileSync(secretFile, secret, { mode: 0o600 });
+  } catch {
+    // Best-effort persistence: even if the write fails we still return a usable
+    // secret for this process so hooks/middleware agree within this run.
+  }
+  cachedSecret = secret;
+  return cachedSecret;
+}

src/hooks-config.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
  *
  * Generates `.claude/settings.local.json` with hook definitions that POST
  * to Codeman's `/api/hook-event` endpoint when Claude Code fires hooks.
- * Uses `$CODEMAN_API_URL` and `$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` env vars (set on every
- * managed session) so the config is static per case directory.
+ * Uses `$CODEMAN_API_URL`, `$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`, and `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE`
+ * env vars (set on every managed session) so the config is static per case
+ * directory and free of secret values.
  *
  * Key exports:
  * - `generateHooksConfig()` — returns hooks object for settings.local.json
@@ -41,11 +42,18 @@ import { HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS } from './config/auth-config.js';
 export function generateHooksConfig(): { hooks: Record<string, unknown[]> } {
   // Read Claude Code's stdin JSON and forward it as the data field.
   // Falls back to empty object if stdin is unavailable or malformed.
+  // COD-54: present the per-instance hook secret so the bypass keeps working while
+  // a tunnel is running. The value is read from the secret file AT EXECUTION TIME
+  // (path via $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE, set in every managed session's env), so it
+  // never lands in this config and rotation needs no respawn. If the var/file is
+  // missing the header is empty — the middleware then allows the request only on
+  // the plain loopback bypass (tunnel down), same as pre-secret behavior.
   const curlCmd = (event: HookEventType) =>
     `HOOK_DATA=$(cat 2>/dev/null || echo '{}'); ` +
     `printf '{"event":"${event}","sessionId":"%s","data":%s}' "$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID" "$HOOK_DATA" | ` +
     `curl -s -X POST "$CODEMAN_API_URL/api/hook-event" ` +
     `-H 'Content-Type: application/json' ` +
+    `-H "X-Codeman-Hook-Secret: $(cat "$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE" 2>/dev/null)" ` +
     `--data @- ` +
     `2>/dev/null || true`;
 

src/session-cli-builder.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 import type { ClaudeMode, EffortLevel } from './types.js';
 import { isEffortLevel } from './types.js';
 import { getAugmentedPath } from './utils/index.js';
+import { dataPath } from './config/instance.js';
 
 /**
  * Build Claude CLI permission flags based on the configured mode.
@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ export function buildClaudeEnv(sessionId: string): Record<string, string | undef
     CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
     CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId,
     CODEMAN_API_URL: process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL || 'http://localhost:3000',
+    // Path only (not the secret value) — hook curls cat it at execution time (COD-54)
+    CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE: dataPath('hook-secret'),
   };
 }
 
@@ -149,5 +152,7 @@ export function buildShellEnv(sessionId: string): Record<string, string | undefi
     CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
     CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId,
     CODEMAN_API_URL: process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL || 'http://localhost:3000',
+    // Path only (not the secret value) — hook curls cat it at execution time (COD-54)
+    CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE: dataPath('hook-secret'),
   };
 }

src/tmux-manager.ts

@@ -857,6 +857,9 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       `export CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=${sessionId}`,
       `export CODEMAN_MUX_NAME=${muxName}`,
       `export CODEMAN_API_URL=${process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`,
+      // Path only (not the secret value): hook curl commands cat the file at
+      // execution time, so the COD-54 hook secret stays off the command line.
+      `export CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE="${dataPath('hook-secret')}"`,
     ];
     // Only unset CLAUDECODE for Claude sessions
     if (mode === 'claude') exports.splice(2, 0, 'unset CLAUDECODE');

src/web/middleware/auth.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import {
   AUTH_FAILURE_MAX,
   AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
 } from '../../config/auth-config.js';
+import { getHookSecret, HOOK_SECRET_HEADER } from '../../config/hook-secret.js';
 
 // Auth session cookie name
 export const AUTH_COOKIE_NAME = 'codeman_session';
@@ -28,19 +29,32 @@ interface AuthState {
   authSessions: StaleExpirationMap<string, AuthSessionRecord> | null;
   authFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
   qrAuthFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
+  hookSecretFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
 }
 
 /**
  * Register HTTP Basic Auth middleware with session cookies and rate limiting.
  * Only active when CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set.
  *
+ * @param getTunnelRunning - returns true while a managed tunnel is active. Used
+ *   to gate the `/api/hook-event` localhost bypass: when a tunnel is up, tunneled
+ *   internet traffic reaches the loopback origin with `req.ip === 127.0.0.1`, so
+ *   the bypass additionally requires the shared hook secret (COD-54). When no
+ *   tunnel is running (loopback-only, the normal case) the plain localhost bypass
+ *   is kept so already-deployed (pre-secret) hooks + the loop channel keep working.
+ *   Optional; defaults to "no tunnel" (unchanged behavior) when omitted.
  * @returns AuthState for lifecycle management (dispose on server stop)
  */
-export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): AuthState {
+export function registerAuthMiddleware(
+  app: FastifyInstance,
+  https: boolean,
+  getTunnelRunning: () => boolean = () => false
+): AuthState {
   const state: AuthState = {
     authSessions: null,
     authFailures: null,
     qrAuthFailures: null,
+    hookSecretFailures: null,
   };
 
   const authPassword = process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
@@ -67,24 +81,70 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
     refreshOnGet: false,
   });
 
+  // Separate hook-secret failure counter (COD-54). MUST NOT share authFailures:
+  // legacy (pre-secret) hook configs fire constantly from 127.0.0.1, and counting
+  // their 401s against the shared bucket would 429 every cookie-less request from
+  // loopback — locking out the Basic-Auth login path (and, through a tunnel, every
+  // client, since tunneled traffic also arrives as 127.0.0.1).
+  state.hookSecretFailures = new StaleExpirationMap<string, number>({
+    ttlMs: AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
+    refreshOnGet: false,
+  });
+
   const authSessions = state.authSessions;
   const authFailures = state.authFailures;
+  const hookSecretFailures = state.hookSecretFailures;
 
-  function sendAuthRateLimit(reply: FastifyReply, clientIp: string): void {
-    const remainingMs = authFailures.getRemainingTtl(clientIp) ?? AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS;
+  function sendAuthRateLimit(
+    reply: FastifyReply,
+    clientIp: string,
+    failures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> = authFailures
+  ): void {
+    const remainingMs = failures.getRemainingTtl(clientIp) ?? AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS;
     const retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(remainingMs / 1000));
     reply.header('Retry-After', String(retryAfterSeconds));
     reply.code(429).send('Too Many Requests — try again later');
   }
 
   app.addHook('onRequest', (req, reply, done) => {
-    // Hook events come from local Claude Code hooks (curl from localhost) — no auth headers available.
-    // Safe: validated by HookEventSchema, only triggers broadcasts.
-    // Security: restrict bypass to localhost only — prevents forged hook events via tunnel/LAN.
+    // Hook events come from local Claude Code hooks (curl from localhost) — no
+    // Basic-Auth credentials available. Validated downstream by HookEventSchema.
+    //
+    // COD-54: the bare localhost bypass is unsafe while a tunnel is running, because
+    // `cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
+    // loopback origin, so a tunneled request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 and
+    // would pass. So:
+    //   - tunnel running → bypass requires the shared hook secret (local hooks present
+    //     it via the X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; internet traffic can't know it),
+    //   - tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → keep the plain
+    //     localhost bypass so already-deployed (pre-secret) hooks + the loop's own
+    //     credential-less hook channel keep working.
     if (req.url === '/api/hook-event' && req.method === 'POST') {
       const ip = req.ip;
-      if (ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1') {
-        done();
+      const isLoopback = ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1';
+      if (isLoopback) {
+        if (!getTunnelRunning()) {
+          // Loopback-only: unchanged behavior.
+          done();
+          return;
+        }
+        // Tunnel up: require the shared secret (constant-time compare).
+        const presented = Buffer.from(req.headers[HOOK_SECRET_HEADER.toLowerCase()]?.toString() ?? '');
+        const expected = Buffer.from(getHookSecret());
+        if (presented.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(presented, expected)) {
+          done();
+          return;
+        }
+        // Wrong/absent secret while tunneled — rate-limit per IP in the DEDICATED
+        // hook bucket (never authFailures, which would lock out the login path).
+        const hookIp = req.ip;
+        const hookFailures = hookSecretFailures.get(hookIp) ?? 0;
+        if (hookFailures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
+          sendAuthRateLimit(reply, hookIp, hookSecretFailures);
+          return;
+        }
+        hookSecretFailures.set(hookIp, hookFailures + 1);
+        reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized: hook secret required');
         return;
       }
       // Non-localhost hook requests fall through to normal auth

src/web/network-auth-policy.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,16 @@ export function isExplicitlyEnabled(value: string | undefined): boolean {
   return value !== undefined && EXPLICIT_TRUE_VALUES.has(value.trim().toLowerCase());
 }
 
+/**
+ * True when unauthenticated network exposure is acceptable: either a password is
+ * set (auth active) or the operator explicitly acknowledged it. Used by the
+ * tunnel-enable guard (COD-55) to refuse publishing an unauthenticated public URL.
+ */
+export function isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged(allowFlag = false): boolean {
+  if (process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD) return true;
+  return allowFlag || isExplicitlyEnabled(process.env.CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK);
+}
+
 export function isLoopbackBindHost(host: string): boolean {
   const normalized = host
     .trim()

src/web/public/settings-ui.js

@@ -844,11 +844,18 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     btn.disabled = true;
     try {
       const newEnabled = !isActive;
-      await fetch('/api/settings', {
+      const res = await fetch('/api/settings', {
         method: 'PUT',
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify({ tunnelEnabled: newEnabled }),
       });
+      // COD-55: server refuses an unauthenticated public tunnel (403). Surface it.
+      if (newEnabled && (await this._handleTunnelEnableRefusal(res))) {
+        this._dismissTunnelConnecting();
+        this._updateWelcomeTunnelBtn(false);
+        btn.disabled = false;
+        return;
+      }
       if (newEnabled) {
         this._showTunnelConnecting();
         // Poll tunnel status as fallback in case SSE event is missed
@@ -1148,13 +1155,40 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     return `${Math.floor(hrs / 24)}d ago`;
   },
 
+  /**
+   * COD-55: detect the server's refusal to start an unauthenticated public tunnel.
+   * The PUT /api/settings route returns a 4xx with { success:false, error } when no
+   * CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set and the unauthenticated-network opt-in is not acknowledged.
+   * Shows the server's (actionable) message as an error toast.
+   * @param {Response|null} res - the fetch Response from the settings PUT
+   * @returns {Promise<boolean>} true if the tunnel-enable was refused (caller should abort)
+   */
+  async _handleTunnelEnableRefusal(res) {
+    if (!res || res.ok) return false;
+    let message = 'Tunnel refused: set CODEMAN_PASSWORD before exposing Codeman publicly.';
+    try {
+      const body = await res.json();
+      if (body && body.error) message = body.error;
+    } catch {
+      /* non-JSON body — use the default message */
+    }
+    this._dismissTunnelConnecting?.();
+    this.showToast(message, 'error');
+    return true;
+  },
+
   async _tunnelPanelToggle(enable) {
     try {
-      await fetch('/api/settings', {
+      const res = await fetch('/api/settings', {
         method: 'PUT',
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify({ tunnelEnabled: enable }),
       });
+      // COD-55: server refuses an unauthenticated public tunnel (403). Surface it.
+      if (enable && (await this._handleTunnelEnableRefusal(res))) {
+        this.closeTunnelPanel();
+        return;
+      }
       if (enable) {
         this._updateTunnelIndicator(false);
         const indicator = document.getElementById('tunnelIndicator');
@@ -1473,7 +1507,24 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     // Strip device-specific keys — localEchoEnabled/cjkInputEnabled are per-platform
     const { localEchoEnabled: _leo, cjkInputEnabled: _cjk, extendedKeyboardBar: _ekb, ...serverSettings } = settings;
     try {
-      await this._apiPut('/api/settings', { ...serverSettings, notificationPreferences: notifPrefsToSave, voiceSettings });
+      const res = await this._apiPut('/api/settings', {
+        ...serverSettings,
+        notificationPreferences: notifPrefsToSave,
+        voiceSettings,
+      });
+
+      // COD-55: the server refuses an unauthenticated public tunnel with a 403 — which
+      // rejects the WHOLE settings PUT. Surface the message and revert the tunnel toggle
+      // (in the UI + localStorage) so it doesn't look enabled. Other settings persisted
+      // to localStorage above still apply locally.
+      if (settings.tunnelEnabled && (await this._handleTunnelEnableRefusal(res))) {
+        settings.tunnelEnabled = false;
+        this.saveAppSettingsToStorage(settings);
+        const cb = document.getElementById('appSettingsTunnelEnabled');
+        if (cb) cb.checked = false;
+        this.closeAppSettings();
+        return;
+      }
 
       // Save model configuration separately
       await this.saveModelConfigFromSettings();

src/web/routes/system-routes.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { execSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
 import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
 import { dataPath } from '../../config/instance.js';
 import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse, getErrorMessage, type NiceConfig } from '../../types.js';
+import { isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged } from '../network-auth-policy.js';
 import {
   ConfigUpdateSchema,
   SettingsUpdateSchema,
@@ -498,6 +499,26 @@ export function registerSystemRoutes(
   app.put('/api/settings', async (req) => {
     const settings = parseBody(SettingsUpdateSchema, req.body, 'Invalid settings') as Record<string, unknown>;
 
+    // COD-55: enabling the Cloudflare tunnel publishes the whole app (full terminal
+    // control = effectively RCE) to a public *.trycloudflare.com URL. Because the
+    // tunnel binds to loopback, server.ts's non-loopback bind guard never trips, and
+    // with no CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive — so the tunnel URL is
+    // unauthenticated. Refuse to start a tunnel unless auth is configured OR the
+    // operator has acknowledged unauthenticated-network exposure. A public tunnel is
+    // higher-stakes than a LAN bind, so this is REFUSE (vs the bind guard's warn).
+    // Guard runs BEFORE persisting so a refused tunnelEnabled:true is not saved.
+    if (settings.tunnelEnabled === true && !ctx.tunnelManager.isRunning() && !isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged()) {
+      const msg =
+        'Refusing to start the Cloudflare tunnel without authentication: it would publish ' +
+        'full terminal control to a public URL with no password. Set CODEMAN_PASSWORD to ' +
+        'require login, or set CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 to acknowledge an ' +
+        'unauthenticated public tunnel.';
+      throw Object.assign(new Error(msg), {
+        statusCode: 403,
+        body: createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, msg),
+      });
+    }
+
     try {
       const dir = dirname(SETTINGS_PATH);
       if (!existsSync(dir)) {

src/web/server.ts

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { hostname as getHostname } from 'node:os';
 import { dataPath } from '../config/instance.js';
+import { getHookSecret } from '../config/hook-secret.js';
 import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';
 import { Session, isExternalCliMode, type BackgroundTask } from '../session.js';
 import type { ClaudeMode, SessionState } from '../types.js';
@@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
   private authSessions: StaleExpirationMap<string, import('./ports/auth-port.js').AuthSessionRecord> | null = null;
   private authFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null = null;
   private qrAuthFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null = null;
+  private hookSecretFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null = null;
   private pushStore: PushSubscriptionStore = new PushSubscriptionStore();
   private teamWatcher: TeamWatcher = new TeamWatcher();
   private _orchestratorLoop: import('../orchestrator-loop.js').OrchestratorLoop | null = null;
@@ -603,11 +605,12 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
     registerHostGuard(this.app, () => this.getHostPolicy());
 
     // Auth middleware (Basic Auth + session cookies + rate limiting)
-    const authState = registerAuthMiddleware(this.app, this.https);
+    const authState = registerAuthMiddleware(this.app, this.https, () => this.tunnelManager.isRunning());
     if (authState) {
       this.authSessions = authState.authSessions;
       this.authFailures = authState.authFailures;
       this.qrAuthFailures = authState.qrAuthFailures;
+      this.hookSecretFailures = authState.hookSecretFailures;
     }
 
     // WebSocket support (terminal I/O — low-latency bidirectional channel)
@@ -1816,6 +1819,10 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
       this.host === '0.0.0.0' || this.host === 'localhost' || this.host === '::1' ? '127.0.0.1' : this.host;
     process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL = `${protocol}://${apiHost}:${this.port}`;
 
+    // Ensure the COD-54 hook secret exists on disk before any session exports
+    // $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE — hook curls cat that path at execution time.
+    getHookSecret();
+
     // Start scheduled runs cleanup timer
     this.cleanup.setInterval(
       () => {
@@ -2298,6 +2305,10 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
       this.qrAuthFailures.dispose();
       this.qrAuthFailures = null;
     }
+    if (this.hookSecretFailures) {
+      this.hookSecretFailures.dispose();
+      this.hookSecretFailures = null;
+    }
     this.activePlanOrchestrators.clear();
     this.cleaningUp.clear();