Replace markdown denylist sanitizer with vendored DOMPurify (mXSS hardening)

The previous _sanitizeHtml was a denylist over agent/transcript markdown
rendered via innerHTML; it missed style attributes and the svg/math mXSS
namespaces — e.g. <svg><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></svg>
re-serialized into a live <img onerror>.

Vendor DOMPurify 3.4.8 (allowlist) following the existing marked.min.js
vendor pattern (same-origin, CSP script-src 'self'; not in package.json so
no lockfile drift). New sanitize-html.js wires a hardened allowlist config
(FORBID style/svg/math/script/iframe/object/embed/form; no data attrs);
app.js _sanitizeHtml delegates to it with a fail-closed escape-all fallback.
index.html loads dompurify -> sanitize-html -> app.js (defer); build.mjs
minifies + content-hashes sanitize-html.js.

Test: test/markdown-sanitizer.test.ts (jsdom, real shipping artifacts) —
mXSS payloads neutralized + legit markdown preserved.
This commit is contained in:
Aamer Akhter
2026-06-14 12:33:48 -04:00
parent e742d00c98
commit ea53916adc
6 changed files with 361 additions and 21 deletions
+159
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/**
* @fileoverview Allowlist-based HTML sanitizer for markdown-rendered, agent/transcript-derived
* content that is subsequently assigned via innerHTML (response viewer, attachment markdown
* preview, message bodies).
*
* Security (COD-56): the previous sanitizer was a hand-rolled DENYLIST — it removed a fixed
* set of tags (script/iframe/object/embed/form/base/meta/link/style), stripped on* attrs and a
* few dangerous URL schemes, then re-serialized. Denylists are mXSS-prone: they did not strip
* `svg`/`math` (which carry their own foreign-namespace parsing rules and can smuggle script via
* namespace confusion), did not strip `style` attributes (CSS `expression()`/`url(javascript:)`
* on legacy engines), and had no positive allowlist, so any tag/attribute not explicitly named
* survived. `marked` runs with raw-HTML passthrough, so crafted HTML echoed by an agent flows
* straight into this function.
*
* This module replaces that with DOMPurify (Cure53), an allowlist sanitizer that is the
* industry standard for mXSS defense. It is configured to allow exactly the tag/attribute set
* that markdown rendering legitimately produces (headings, lists, code, blockquotes, links,
* tables, images with safe src) and to FORBID `style`/`svg`/`math` plus all event handlers and
* dangerous URL schemes.
*
* Cross-environment: in the browser this file runs as a classic <script> after
* vendor/dompurify.min.js and wires `window.sanitizeMarkdownHtml`. The factory is also exported
* (window/globalThis + CommonJS) so a jsdom unit test can build a sanitizer bound to a
* jsdom-window DOMPurify instance and exercise the exact same config.
*
* @globals {function} sanitizeMarkdownHtml - (html:string) => string, sanitized HTML
* @globals {function} createMarkdownSanitizer - (DOMPurify) => sanitizeMarkdownHtml (for tests)
* @dependency vendor/dompurify.min.js (provides the global DOMPurify)
* @loadorder 5.6 of 15 — after input-cjk.js(5.5), before app.js(6) (app.js calls it)
*/
(function (root) {
'use strict';
/**
* Tags markdown rendering (marked, gfm) legitimately emits. Anything outside this set is
* dropped by DOMPurify. Deliberately excludes svg/math (mXSS foreign-namespace vectors) and
* form/embed/object/iframe/script/style (no place in rendered markdown).
*/
var ALLOWED_TAGS = [
'a',
'b',
'blockquote',
'br',
'caption',
'code',
'del',
'div',
'em',
'h1',
'h2',
'h3',
'h4',
'h5',
'h6',
'hr',
'i',
'img',
'ins',
'kbd',
'li',
'mark',
'ol',
'p',
'pre',
'q',
's',
'samp',
'span',
'strong',
'sub',
'sup',
'table',
'tbody',
'td',
'tfoot',
'th',
'thead',
'tr',
'ul',
'var',
];
/**
* Attributes allowed on the tags above. `style` is intentionally absent (CSS-based vectors).
* `class`/`id` survive because the response viewer adds wrapper classes downstream and code
* blocks may carry `language-*` classes from marked.
*/
var ALLOWED_ATTR = [
'href',
'src',
'alt',
'title',
'class',
'id',
'name',
'colspan',
'rowspan',
'align',
'width',
'height',
'lang',
'dir',
'start',
'reversed',
'type',
];
/**
* Build a sanitizer bound to a specific DOMPurify instance. The browser passes the global
* DOMPurify; tests pass a jsdom-window-bound instance so the same config is exercised under
* vitest without a real browser.
*/
function createMarkdownSanitizer(DOMPurify) {
if (!DOMPurify || typeof DOMPurify.sanitize !== 'function') {
throw new Error('createMarkdownSanitizer: a DOMPurify instance is required');
}
var CONFIG = {
ALLOWED_TAGS: ALLOWED_TAGS,
ALLOWED_ATTR: ALLOWED_ATTR,
// Defense in depth even though style/svg/math are not in ALLOWED_TAGS: also forbid the
// foreign-namespace roots and style so config drift can't silently re-admit them.
FORBID_TAGS: ['style', 'svg', 'math', 'script', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form'],
FORBID_ATTR: ['style'],
// No data: URIs except images; block the rest. SVG/MathML namespaces fully disabled.
USE_PROFILES: { html: true },
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: false,
ADD_ATTR: [],
RETURN_DOM: false,
RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: false,
// Keep text content of any removed element (so stripping a stray tag doesn't eat prose),
// matching the previous serializer's behavior of dropping the element but not its text.
KEEP_CONTENT: true,
};
return function sanitizeMarkdownHtml(html) {
return DOMPurify.sanitize(html == null ? '' : String(html), CONFIG);
};
}
// Expose the factory for tests (and any non-browser consumer).
if (root) {
root.createMarkdownSanitizer = createMarkdownSanitizer;
// In the browser, vendor/dompurify.min.js has already defined the global DOMPurify.
if (root.DOMPurify && typeof root.DOMPurify.sanitize === 'function') {
root.sanitizeMarkdownHtml = createMarkdownSanitizer(root.DOMPurify);
}
}
// CommonJS export for the vitest/jsdom unit test.
if (typeof module !== 'undefined' && module.exports) {
module.exports = {
createMarkdownSanitizer: createMarkdownSanitizer,
ALLOWED_TAGS: ALLOWED_TAGS,
ALLOWED_ATTR: ALLOWED_ATTR,
};
}
})(typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' ? globalThis : typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window : this);