feat(docker): allowlist container-to-host gateway aliases in host guard

An in-container hook curl carries Host: host.docker.internal:<port> (the derived
CODEMAN_API_URL), so the always-on host guard must allow host.docker.internal /
host.containers.internal or every in-container hook is blocked 403. Exact-match
only; not a browser DNS-rebinding surface (resolves to the host only from inside
a container netns). Verified end-to-end: quick-start launches claude/shell in a
real container with the workspace bind-mounted and hooks scaffolded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-07-19 15:32:45 +02:00
parent 8768ca4a5a
commit e9f9497259
2 changed files with 19 additions and 0 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ describe('isAllowedRequestHost — anti-DNS-rebinding', () => {
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('eviltrycloudflare.com', loopback)).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts the docker/podman container-to-host gateway aliases (in-container hooks)', () => {
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.docker.internal:3000', loopback)).toBe(true);
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.containers.internal:3000', loopback)).toBe(true);
// a lookalike is still rejected (exact match only)
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.docker.internal.evil.com', loopback)).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts the configured bind host when it is a hostname', () => {
const policy: HostPolicy = { bindHost: 'mybox.local', allowedHosts: [], tunnelHost: null };
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('mybox.local:3000', policy)).toBe(true);