diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index ed423971..f3e2a378 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 **Files panel search** (COD-236, the `q` param on `GET /api/sessions/:id/files`): `compileFileQuery()` (`utils/file-query.ts`, pure, no IO, so it unit-tests directly) compiles the query into a reusable predicate, which is what lets the server-side walk prune instead of streaming the whole tree. ⚠️ **A query turns that endpoint into a FLAT match list rather than a nested tree**, and the walk deliberately recurses past non-matching directories, since the whole point of searching is to reach a file whose ancestors do not match. An empty or whitespace-only query compiles to `null`, which is what keeps the default tree response byte-identical when no search is requested. ⚠️ **Globs are never compiled into a RegExp**: `*a*a*a…` translated to `^.*a.*a.*a…$` is a classic backtracking blowup evaluated synchronously against every walked path, so one pathological query would freeze the event loop for the whole server (the same reason `search-service.ts` is regex-free). `globMatch()` is a two-pointer wildcard walk instead, O(text · pattern) with both operands short by construction, and an overlong query (`MAX_QUERY_LENGTH`, 256) also compiles to `null` rather than running. A query containing `/` matches the relative path, otherwise the bare entry name; globs match anchored and case-insensitively (`*` spans any run, slashes included, `?` exactly one character), everything else is a plain case-insensitive substring.
 
-**Raw file bodies are streamed and range-aware**: `file-raw` and the attachments `/raw` route always advertise `Accept-Ranges: bytes` and answer a `Range` header with `206` + `Content-Range` (single-range only; parser is pure + unit-tested in `src/web/http-range.ts`, a malformed spec is ignored → 200 while an out-of-bounds one is a 416). ⚠️ A 200-only response is what made the File Viewer's `<video>` unseekable: Chrome then reports `video.seekable` as `[0, 0]`, the scrub bar is inert and `currentTime = x` silently reverts (measured on an 18MB mp4), and Safari refuses to start the media at all. ⚠️ These bodies go out through `reply.hijack()`, which bypasses Fastify's status handling — `sendRawStream` must copy the status onto `reply.raw` by hand or a partial body ships labelled `200` and the browser treats a slice as the whole file. ⚠️ Closing the preview must **pause and unload** the media (`_stopFilePreviewMedia` in panels-ui.js): dropping the overlay's `visible` class is `display:none` and nothing else, and a DETACHED `HTMLMediaElement` keeps playing, which is how the X button used to leave a video audible with no player to pause.
+**Raw file bodies are streamed and range-aware**: `file-raw`, the attachments `/raw` route and `GET /api/download` always advertise `Accept-Ranges: bytes` and answer a `Range` header with `206` + `Content-Range` (single-range only; parser is pure + unit-tested in `src/web/http-range.ts`, a malformed spec is ignored → 200 while an out-of-bounds one is a 416). ⚠️ **The size cap on all three is a sanity bound, not memory protection** (`MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES` in `config/buffer-limits.ts`, default 2GB, env `CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES`, `0` = unlimited): the bodies stream, so size costs a read stream and not RSS (measured: a 600MB download moved peak RSS by ~37MB). Its predecessor was a hardcoded 50MB whose comment still said "prevent memory exhaustion" long after the `readFile()` it described was replaced by `sendFileBody()`, so all it did was refuse legitimate downloads of build artifacts, videos and archives. `/api/download` was the last route that really did buffer the whole file, and now shares `sendFileBody()` with the other two. ⚠️ A 200-only response is what made the File Viewer's `<video>` unseekable: Chrome then reports `video.seekable` as `[0, 0]`, the scrub bar is inert and `currentTime = x` silently reverts (measured on an 18MB mp4), and Safari refuses to start the media at all. ⚠️ These bodies go out through `reply.hijack()`, which bypasses Fastify's status handling — `sendRawStream` must copy the status onto `reply.raw` by hand or a partial body ships labelled `200` and the browser treats a slice as the whole file. ⚠️ Closing the preview must **pause and unload** the media (`_stopFilePreviewMedia` in panels-ui.js): dropping the overlay's `visible` class is `display:none` and nothing else, and a DETACHED `HTMLMediaElement` keeps playing, which is how the X button used to leave a video audible with no player to pause.
 
 **Ultracode / workflow-run visualization** (opt-in, default OFF): the Workflow tool writes a completion artifact only at run *end*, so live in-flight runs exist solely as transcript dirs. `workflow-run-watcher.ts` therefore synthesizes ACTIVE runs from transcripts until the completion artifact appears and supersedes them. It is **STANDALONE** and deliberately never imports or touches `subagent-watcher.ts`, despite reading the same tree. Two independent toggles: `showUltracodeAgents` (docked panel) and `ultracodeFloatingWindows` (floating windows); the watcher starts if **either** is on. → [architecture-invariants#ultracode--workflow-run-visualization](docs/architecture-invariants.md#ultracode-and-workflow-run-visualization)
 
diff --git a/docs/security-architecture.md b/docs/security-architecture.md
index 719caac3..4677ca63 100644
--- a/docs/security-architecture.md
+++ b/docs/security-architecture.md
@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ TOCTOU window.
 | Route | Cap | Notes |
 |-------|-----|-------|
 | `file-content` | 10 MB | text preview |
-| `file-raw` | 50 MB | inline MIME map; **`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on all responses**; streamed, `Range`-aware (206 slices come from the same validated path, and the cap is checked before the range) |
-| `POST /api/download` | 50 MB | forced `attachment`; sensitive‑path blocklist |
+| `file-raw` | 2 GB (`CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES`, `0` = unlimited) | inline MIME map; **`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on all responses**; streamed, `Range`-aware (206 slices come from the same validated path, and the cap is checked before the range) |
+| `GET /api/download` | same cap | forced `attachment`; sensitive‑path blocklist; streamed, `Range`-aware |
 
 ### SVG / content‑type XSS
 
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ the attachment guard below.
 
 Live external attachments (`src/attachment-registry.ts`) mint an `att_<uuid>` id
 for a host file so browser requests carry the id, never an absolute path. Serving
-is by id (`GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw`, 50 MB cap,
+is by id (`GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw`, same download cap,
 `nosniff`) and re‑resolves the symlink + re‑checks the **attachment guard**
 (`src/config/attachment-guard.ts`: the shared sensitive‑path blocklist **plus**
 the `/root` and `/etc` trees, extendable via `attachmentBlockedPaths` /
diff --git a/docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md b/docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md
index 532c155e..7e43ad92 100644
--- a/docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md
+++ b/docs/wiki/Working-With-Files.md
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ It renders what it can:
 | PDF and Office documents | Converted for preview when a converter is available.                       |
 | Anything else            | Download.                                                                  |
 
-Caps: 10 MB for text preview, 50 MB for raw and download. Sensitive paths (`.env`, anything
+Caps: 10 MB for text preview, 2 GB for raw and download (set `CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES`
+to change it, `0` for no limit — these bodies are streamed, so a large file costs a read
+stream rather than server memory). Sensitive paths (`.env`, anything
 matching credentials, `~/.ssh`, AWS credentials) are blocked from download, and SVG and HTML
 are served as downloads rather than rendered, so they cannot execute in the page.
 
diff --git a/src/config/buffer-limits.ts b/src/config/buffer-limits.ts
index d484fe2c..6c1febd3 100644
--- a/src/config/buffer-limits.ts
+++ b/src/config/buffer-limits.ts
@@ -112,3 +112,50 @@ export const FILE_PEEK_BYTES = 8 * 1024 - 1; // 8KB (inclusive end offset)
  * Override: CODEMAN_MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES (bytes)
  */
 export const MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES = parseInt(process.env.CODEMAN_MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES || '') || 50 * 1024 * 1024; // 50MB
+
+// ============================================================================
+// File Download Limits
+// ============================================================================
+
+/**
+ * Parse a byte-limit env var, where `0` explicitly means "no limit".
+ *
+ * The `parseInt(...) || default` idiom used elsewhere in this file cannot
+ * express that: it treats 0 as falsy and silently restores the default.
+ */
+function parseByteLimitEnv(raw: string | undefined, fallback: number): number {
+  if (raw === undefined || raw.trim() === '') return fallback;
+  const parsed = Number.parseInt(raw, 10);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed < 0) return fallback;
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Maximum size (bytes) of a file served by the raw/download file routes:
+ * `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-raw` (the Files panel's download link and the
+ * file-preview overlay), the attachment `/raw` route, and `GET /api/download`.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ This is a sanity bound, NOT memory protection. All three bodies are
+ * STREAMED and `Range`-aware (`sendFileBody` in file-routes.ts), so a large
+ * file costs one read stream rather than its size in RSS. The historical 50MB
+ * cap predates that streaming rewrite and its "prevent memory exhaustion"
+ * comment described a `readFile()` that no longer exists — all it did was
+ * refuse legitimate downloads of build artifacts, videos and archives.
+ *
+ * Set `CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES=0` to remove the cap entirely.
+ * Override: CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES (bytes)
+ */
+export const MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = parseByteLimitEnv(
+  process.env.CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES,
+  2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 2GB
+);
+
+/** True when `size` exceeds the download cap (a cap of 0 means unlimited). */
+export function exceedsDownloadLimit(size: number): boolean {
+  return MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES > 0 && size > MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES;
+}
+
+/** Human-readable "File too large (…)" message for a refused download. */
+export function downloadTooLargeMessage(size: number): string {
+  return `File too large (${Math.round(size / 1024 / 1024)}MB > ${Math.round(MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES / 1024 / 1024)}MB limit). Raise or remove it with CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES (0 = unlimited).`;
+}
diff --git a/src/web/routes/file-routes.ts b/src/web/routes/file-routes.ts
index b578d576..7f380b37 100644
--- a/src/web/routes/file-routes.ts
+++ b/src/web/routes/file-routes.ts
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ import {
 } from '../route-helpers.js';
 import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
 import type { SessionAttachmentHistoryItem, SessionState } from '../../types/session.js';
+import { downloadTooLargeMessage, exceedsDownloadLimit } from '../../config/buffer-limits.js';
 import { parseByteRange } from '../http-range.js';
 import { isSensitivePath } from '../sensitive-path.js';
 import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
@@ -183,16 +184,8 @@ async function serveRawFile(
   rangeHeader?: string | string[]
 ): Promise<void> {
   const stat = await fs.stat(resolvedPath);
-  const MAX_RAW_ATTACHMENT_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024; // 50MB, matching file-raw / download
-  if (stat.size > MAX_RAW_ATTACHMENT_SIZE) {
-    reply
-      .code(413)
-      .send(
-        createErrorResponse(
-          ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
-          `File too large (${Math.round(stat.size / 1024 / 1024)}MB > ${MAX_RAW_ATTACHMENT_SIZE / 1024 / 1024}MB limit)`
-        )
-      );
+  if (exceedsDownloadLimit(stat.size)) {
+    reply.code(413).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, downloadTooLargeMessage(stat.size)));
     return;
   }
   // Markup is download-only: served with a renderable type on our own origin it
@@ -1562,18 +1555,11 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
     const { resolvedPath } = validated;
 
     try {
-      // Validate file size before reading (DoS protection - prevent memory exhaustion)
-      const MAX_RAW_FILE_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024; // 50MB for raw files
+      // Sanity bound only: the body below is streamed and Range-aware, so size
+      // does not translate into resident memory. Configurable, 0 = unlimited.
       const stat = await fs.stat(resolvedPath);
-      if (stat.size > MAX_RAW_FILE_SIZE) {
-        reply
-          .code(400)
-          .send(
-            createErrorResponse(
-              ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
-              `File too large (${Math.round(stat.size / 1024 / 1024)}MB > ${MAX_RAW_FILE_SIZE / 1024 / 1024}MB limit)`
-            )
-          );
+      if (exceedsDownloadLimit(stat.size)) {
+        reply.code(413).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, downloadTooLargeMessage(stat.size)));
         return;
       }
 
@@ -1954,17 +1940,8 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
         return;
       }
 
-      // 50MB size limit
-      const MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024;
-      if (stat.size > MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE) {
-        reply
-          .code(400)
-          .send(
-            createErrorResponse(
-              ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
-              `File too large (${Math.round(stat.size / 1024 / 1024)}MB > 50MB limit)`
-            )
-          );
+      if (exceedsDownloadLimit(stat.size)) {
+        reply.code(413).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, downloadTooLargeMessage(stat.size)));
         return;
       }
 
@@ -1988,15 +1965,13 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
       };
 
       const filename = pathBasename(resolvedPath);
-      const content = await fs.readFile(resolvedPath);
-      // Bypass Fastify compression — write directly to raw response
-      reply.raw.writeHead(200, {
-        ...inheritedHeaders(reply),
-        'Content-Type': mimeTypes[ext] || 'application/octet-stream',
-        'Content-Disposition': `attachment; filename="${filename}"`,
-        'Content-Length': content.length,
-      });
-      reply.raw.end(content);
+      // Streamed rather than read into memory, and Range-aware, so a multi-GB
+      // artifact costs one read stream and can be resumed. sendFileBody()
+      // hijacks the reply, which also keeps Fastify's compression out of it.
+      reply.header('Content-Type', mimeTypes[ext] || 'application/octet-stream');
+      reply.header('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition('attachment', filename));
+      reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+      sendFileBody(reply, resolvedPath, stat.size, req.headers.range);
       return;
     } catch (err) {
       reply
diff --git a/test/routes/file-routes-range.test.ts b/test/routes/file-routes-range.test.ts
index f12087fe..91729495 100644
--- a/test/routes/file-routes-range.test.ts
+++ b/test/routes/file-routes-range.test.ts
@@ -191,7 +191,9 @@ describe('file-raw range requests', () => {
   });
 
   it('still refuses files past the raw size cap before looking at Range', async () => {
-    mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 100 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never);
+    // 3GB, past the 2GB CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES default. The cap is checked
+    // before the range, so a small slice of an oversized file is refused too.
+    mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 3 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never);
 
     const res = await harness.app.inject({
       method: 'GET',
@@ -199,6 +201,18 @@ describe('file-raw range requests', () => {
       headers: { range: 'bytes=0-99' },
     });
 
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(413);
+  });
+
+  it('serves a 100MB file that the historical 50MB cap would have refused', async () => {
+    mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 100 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never);
+
+    const res = await harness.app.inject({
+      method: 'GET',
+      url: rawUrl('big.mp4'),
+      headers: { range: 'bytes=0-99' },
+    });
+
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(206);
   });
 });
diff --git a/test/routes/file-routes.test.ts b/test/routes/file-routes.test.ts
index e8c532d3..b2eed19f 100644
--- a/test/routes/file-routes.test.ts
+++ b/test/routes/file-routes.test.ts
@@ -802,14 +802,27 @@ describe('file-routes', () => {
       expect(res.statusCode).toBe(404);
     });
 
-    it('rejects overly large raw files', async () => {
-      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 100 * 1024 * 1024 } as never); // 100MB
+    it('serves a file past the historical 50MB cap', async () => {
+      // The body is streamed and Range-aware, so size costs a read stream, not
+      // RSS. The old 50MB refusal only blocked legitimate artifact downloads.
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 100 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never); // 100MB
 
       const res = await harness.app.inject({
         method: 'GET',
         url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/file-raw?path=huge.bin`,
       });
-      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    });
+
+    it('still refuses a file past the configured download cap', async () => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 3 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never); // 3GB > 2GB default
+
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/file-raw?path=enormous.bin`,
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(413);
+      expect(JSON.parse(res.body).error).toContain('CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES');
     });
   });
 
@@ -863,8 +876,9 @@ describe('file-routes', () => {
     });
 
     it('downloads files scoped to the session working directory', async () => {
-      const content = Buffer.from('download content');
-      mockedReadFile.mockResolvedValue(content as never);
+      // The body is streamed (shared sendFileBody path), so the bytes come from
+      // the createReadStream mock rather than from readFile.
+      const content = Buffer.from('fake file bytes');
       mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true } as never);
 
       const res = await harness.app.inject({
@@ -874,7 +888,19 @@ describe('file-routes', () => {
 
       expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
       expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain('filename="report.txt"');
-      expect(res.body).toBe('download content');
+      expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+      expect(res.body).toBe('fake file bytes');
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a download past the configured cap', async () => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 3 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, isFile: () => true } as never); // 3GB > 2GB default
+
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/download?sessionId=${harness.ctx._sessionId}&path=enormous.bin`,
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(413);
     });
 
     it('rejects absolute paths outside the session working directory', async () => {