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feat(remote): wake a sleeping host when a session is created or attached
Pressing Run on a remote case whose host was asleep failed with `could not verify tmux on remote host 192.168.50.137: …` — an ssh error that blames tmux for a machine that is merely suspended. The only wake paths were typed input on an established session and the banner's Wake button, so OPENING a session (the moment the user actually decides to use that host) had none. `RemoteWakeRegistry.ensureHostAwake()` reuses the existing probe/wake/readiness machinery for a host that has no session yet, and is wired into the two user-initiated create paths: `POST /api/quick-start` for a remote case (before the tmux prereq probe, which is what surfaced the misleading error) and `POST /api/sessions` with `attachRemoteSession`. A host without a wake target is not even probed, so its behavior and latency are byte-identical. The wake is blocking — the caller gets the session or an error — but bounded by REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS (40 s) instead of the 90 s session default, because the dashboard sits behind a reverse proxy whose default `proxy_read_timeout` is 60 s: a longer wait would be cut off at the proxy while the session was still being created. The budget has to cover the whole request (40 s wake + 1.5 s probe + the tmux probe's own 15 s = 56.5 s worst case), which is why it is 40 s and not 45. A timeout now says the host did not come back, and an unreachable host without a wake target says so instead of pointing at tmux. The wiring is deliberately in the HTTP ROUTE, never in the shared session service: `cron-service.ts` builds sessions there with nobody waiting on the answer, and a wake on that path would power the host on for every schedule — the timer-driven re-wake invariant #1 exists to prevent. Both halves are asserted (importers of `remote-wake`, and `ensureHostAwake` having exactly one caller file), so a future caller has to come through the guard test. A rejection from the wake IO is caught too: a broken target must fail the wake, not the route. `remote:hostWaking`/`remote:hostWakeFailed` now carry `forNewSession` for the session-less case, where "input is queued" would be untrue; the toast then reads "the session starts when it is back". Live wake numbers are unchanged (this reuses the measured ~12 s S3 path); the route behavior is covered by new tests in session-routes.test.ts with an injected registry, so no test opens a real socket or ssh.
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@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Model is NOT a session field: it is a composition entry in the profile's config
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### Remote SSH cases
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**Remote host wake-on-LAN from user input**: an optional `RemoteHost.wakeMac` (magic packet built and broadcast by Codeman) or `RemoteHost.wakeCommand` (a single executable path, run WITHOUT a shell, and the explicit override) lets the input route — and an explicit `POST /api/sessions/:id/wake` — wake a SLEEPING host instead of writing into a stalled ssh pane; `tmux send-keys` succeeds against a stalled pane, so the bytes used to vanish silently. The wake flow lives in `src/remote-wake.ts` and is reachable **only** from `POST /api/sessions/:id/input` and that explicit wake route: the COD-108 auto-reconnect watcher, `Server.handleRemoteSessionDropped` and boot recovery must never wake a host, or it would be re-woken seconds after each suspend and could never stay asleep (asserted by a wiring guard in `test/remote-wake.test.ts`, not just documented). `GET /api/sessions/:id/reachability` only ASKS — it never wakes — and feeds the amber "host unreachable" banner (`host-wake-ui.js`) whose action is either Wake or, with no target configured, "Configure WoL" → `#wakeConfigModal` (saved via `PUT /api/remote-hosts/:id`). Detection is a throttled bare TCP probe (no ssh, no `ServerAliveInterval` — keepalives would move bytes into an idle connection every interval), input is buffered and flushed in order after `reattachRemote()` (the send-and-wait path blocks instead), and the wake fields are re-read from `remote-hosts.json` on recovery AND (throttled, cached) live for a running session, because the persisted `remote` snapshot would never see a field added later (`rehydrateRemoteHostFields` + `RemoteWakeDeps.resolveRemote`). Design + invariants: `docs/remote-sessions.md` §Wake-on-LAN from user input.
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**Remote host wake-on-LAN from user input**: an optional `RemoteHost.wakeMac` (magic packet built and broadcast by Codeman) or `RemoteHost.wakeCommand` (a single executable path, run WITHOUT a shell, and the explicit override) lets the input route — and an explicit `POST /api/sessions/:id/wake` — wake a SLEEPING host instead of writing into a stalled ssh pane; `tmux send-keys` succeeds against a stalled pane, so the bytes used to vanish silently. The wake flow lives in `src/remote-wake.ts` and is reachable **only** from an EXPLICIT user request: `POST /api/sessions/:id/input`, that explicit wake route, and the create/attach path (`POST /api/quick-start` for a remote case, `POST /api/sessions` with `attachRemoteSession`, via `ensureHostAwake`), because "the user pressed Run on a sleeping host" is the same kind of request and the tmux probe would otherwise fail with a misleading "needs tmux installed". Everything TIMER-driven must never wake a host: the COD-108 auto-reconnect watcher, `Server.handleRemoteSessionDropped` and boot recovery have no access to the registry, or a host would be re-woken seconds after each suspend and could never stay asleep (asserted by wiring guards in `test/remote-wake.test.ts`, not just documented — including that `ensureHostAwake` is called from the HTTP route only, since `cron-service.ts` builds sessions through the shared service with nobody waiting on the answer). `GET /api/sessions/:id/reachability` only ASKS — it never wakes — and feeds the amber "host unreachable" banner (`host-wake-ui.js`) whose action is either Wake or, with no target configured, "Configure WoL" → `#wakeConfigModal` (saved via `PUT /api/remote-hosts/:id`). Detection is a throttled bare TCP probe (no ssh, no `ServerAliveInterval` — keepalives would move bytes into an idle connection every interval), input is buffered and flushed in order after `reattachRemote()` (the send-and-wait path blocks instead, as does the create path, with a shorter request budget), and the wake fields are re-read from `remote-hosts.json` on recovery AND (throttled, cached) live for a running session, because the persisted `remote` snapshot would never see a field added later (`rehydrateRemoteHostFields` + `RemoteWakeDeps.resolveRemote`). Design + invariants: `docs/remote-sessions.md` §Wake-on-LAN from user input.
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**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket** `-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. ⚠️ The probe's symlink resolution FAILS CLOSED: `readlink -f` where it exists, otherwise a `cd -P`/`pwd -P` directory walk plus a bounded plain-`readlink` loop over the last component, and anything it cannot fully resolve is reported unresolvable (404), never as the unresolved string — the first version resolved the directory chain only, so on a host without `readlink -f` a `ws/notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` link passed containment under its own path while `cat` served the key. Records are NUL-separated and index-keyed so a newline in a filename cannot shift the mapping. ⚠️ ssh children are BOUNDED: probes and buffered reads go through `src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts` (a `document-conversion-limiter`-shaped semaphore, default 4), the attachment-history list probes its whole history in ONE batched call (`probeRemoteAttachmentHistory`, threaded into `registerExternalAttachment({remoteProbes})`), and probes chunk at 40 paths — a prompt-injected agent printing `codeman://attach` links in a remote session used to fork one `ssh` per link. `describeExecError` never returns Node's `Command failed: <ssh line>` message (identity path + probe script in a 502 body). The `PUT /file-content` guard sits AHEAD of `validateSessionFilePath`, which resolves LOCALLY, or a same-named local directory (an sshfs mount) takes the write. Under `VITEST` the three IO functions refuse rather than connect. This covers the ATTACHMENT routes too, which is the half a clicked path needs when the file is OUTSIDE the case directory (`_isExternalPreviewPath` sends it to `POST …/attachments`): registration, by-id `raw`, metadata and the history list all resolve over ssh (`registerExternalAttachment({remote})`, `resolveServableRemoteAttachment`), and what decides the host is the SESSION, never the path string — the same absolute path means a different file on each host. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, `tail-file`. Tests: `test/remote-files.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-remote.test.ts`.
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+25
-6
@@ -368,6 +368,20 @@ it is unreachable it wakes it, polls until the host answers, reattaches the pane
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agent conversation is not restarted), and flushes the input that arrived meanwhile.
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Implementation: `src/remote-wake.ts`.
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The same wake path also serves **opening** a session, which is where a sleeping host used to
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be a dead end: pressing Run on a remote case (`POST /api/quick-start`) or Attach on a
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discovered remote tmux session (`POST /api/sessions` + `attachRemoteSession`) probes the host
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first, and on a sleeping one wakes it, waits for SSH and only then runs the tmux prereq probe.
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Without that the run failed with `could not verify tmux on remote host …` — an ssh error that
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blames tmux for a machine that is merely suspended. The wait is **blocking** (the caller gets
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the session or the error) but bounded by `REMOTE_WAKE_REQUEST_READY_TIMEOUT_MS` (40 s) rather
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than the 90 s session default, because the dashboard sits behind a reverse proxy whose default
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`proxy_read_timeout` is 60 s: a longer wait would be cut off at the proxy while the session was
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still being created. The budget covers the whole request, not just the wait (40 s wake + 1.5 s
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probe + the tmux prereq probe's own 15 s timeout = 56.5 s worst case). A host with no wake target is not even probed on this path, so nothing
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changes for it, and `remote:hostWaking` is broadcast without a `sessionId` (the toast then reads
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"the session starts when it is back" — there is no session yet, and no input queued behind it).
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Two wake paths, `wakeCommand` first because it is the explicit override:
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- **`wakeMac`** — Codeman builds the magic packet itself (`buildMagicPacket`, six `0xFF`
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@@ -387,12 +401,17 @@ banner comes from `GET /api/sessions/:id/reachability`, polled for the active re
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The invariants worth keeping:
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- **Only real user input or an explicit wake request may wake a host.** The COD-108 watcher,
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the server's dropped-session handler and boot recovery have no access to the wake registry —
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a wake there would re-wake the host seconds after every suspend, so it could never stay
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asleep (the same failure `hufflepuff-mcp-lazy` exists to prevent for MCP keepalives). A
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reachability check never wakes: it is a question, not an action. Both are enforced by tests
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in `test/remote-wake.test.ts` and `test/routes/session-remote-wake.test.ts`, not comments.
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- **Only an EXPLICIT request may wake a host:** user input on an established session, the wake
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button, or the user's own session create/attach request (`ensureHostAwake`). Everything that
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runs on a TIMER must never wake one — the COD-108 watcher, the server's dropped-session
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handler, boot recovery and session discovery have no access to the wake registry, and neither
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has the shared session service, because `cron-service.ts` builds sessions there with nobody
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waiting on the answer; a wake on such a path would re-wake the host seconds after every
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suspend, so it could never stay asleep (the same failure `hufflepuff-mcp-lazy` exists to
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prevent for MCP keepalives). A reachability check, a discovery listing and the tmux prereq
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probe never wake: they are questions, not actions. All of it is enforced by tests in
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`test/remote-wake.test.ts` (two wiring guards, one of them asserting `ensureHostAwake` has
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exactly one caller file) and `test/routes/session-remote-wake.test.ts`, not by comments.
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- **Detection is a bare TCP connect** to the SSH port (then the configured `port`, else 22),
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throttled per session, and only for wake-enabled hosts. No `ServerAliveInterval` is added to
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the launch command: keepalives push bytes into an otherwise idle connection every interval,
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