fix(clone): harden per review: symlink-safe scaffolding, race-safe cleanup, decode guard, bounded git queue

Addresses all four findings from the #251 review:

- Scaffolding no longer writes through repository-controlled symlinks.
  The guard lives in hooks-config.ts (settingsWriteBlocker) so it also
  covers quick-start/docker/ralph writers, not just the clone route:
  refuses a symlinked .claude or settings.local.json, a .claude that is
  a file, or one resolving outside the case. The clone route surfaces
  the refusal as a user-visible warning, and the CLAUDE.md write checks
  presence via lstat so a BROKEN repo-shipped symlink counts as present
  (existsSync follows links and would have created the outside target).

- Failed-clone cleanup can no longer delete a concurrent winner's tree:
  git clones into an attempt-owned temp sibling (.<name>.cloning-<rand>)
  which is atomically renamed into place; the loser reports
  DESTINATION_EXISTS and only ever removes its own temp dir.

- decodeURIComponent(url.pathname) is guarded: malformed percent-escapes
  now come back as BAD_SYNTAX instead of an uncaught URIError 500.

- The git pool's waiter queue is bounded (CODEMAN_MAX_GIT_QUEUE, default
  16): overflow answers BUSY immediately (HTTP 429 via RATE_LIMITED),
  and queue time counts against the operation's own deadline.

Tests: hostile symlink fixture repo (route level), settingsWriteBlocker
units, concurrent same-destination race, temp-dir leak assertions,
percent-escape rejection, and a fake-git pool-bounds suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-08-10 00:07:01 +02:00
parent 6cc7b4328b
commit 93df8188a5
6 changed files with 391 additions and 34 deletions
+33 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, beforeEach, afterAll, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { closeSync, existsSync, openSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { closeSync, existsSync, openSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
generateHooksConfig,
generateSubagentStopGuardScript,
refreshStaleCodemanHooks,
settingsWriteBlocker,
writeHooksConfig,
} from '../src/hooks-config.js';
@@ -198,6 +199,37 @@ describe('writeHooksConfig', () => {
expect(parsed.hooks.Stop).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('refuses to write through a symlinked .claude directory (#251 review)', async () => {
// Case contents can be foreign (a freshly cloned repository): a symlinked
// .claude would redirect the scaffold write outside the case.
const outside = join(testDir, 'outside-target');
mkdirSync(outside);
const caseDir = join(testDir, 'case');
mkdirSync(caseDir);
symlinkSync(outside, join(caseDir, '.claude'));
expect(await settingsWriteBlocker(caseDir)).toMatch(/symlink/);
await writeHooksConfig(caseDir);
expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'settings.local.json'))).toBe(false);
});
it('refuses to write through a symlinked settings.local.json (#251 review)', async () => {
const outsideFile = join(testDir, 'victim-settings.json');
writeFileSync(outsideFile, '{"model":"precious"}\n');
const caseDir = join(testDir, 'case2');
mkdirSync(join(caseDir, '.claude'), { recursive: true });
symlinkSync(outsideFile, join(caseDir, '.claude', 'settings.local.json'));
expect(await settingsWriteBlocker(caseDir)).toMatch(/symlink/);
await writeHooksConfig(caseDir);
// The link target is untouched: no hooks were merged into it.
expect(readFileSync(outsideFile, 'utf-8')).toBe('{"model":"precious"}\n');
});
it('reports a real, confined .claude as safe', async () => {
const caseDir = join(testDir, 'case3');
mkdirSync(join(caseDir, '.claude'), { recursive: true });
expect(await settingsWriteBlocker(caseDir)).toBeNull();
});
it('should merge with existing settings.local.json', async () => {
const claudeDir = join(testDir, '.claude');
mkdirSync(claudeDir, { recursive: true });