Merge PR #127: require hook-event secret unconditionally + stale-config self-heal

Require the hook-event secret unconditionally (drop managed-tunnel gating)
This commit is contained in:
Ark0N
2026-06-14 22:43:13 +02:00
committed by GitHub
7 changed files with 199 additions and 40 deletions
+14 -26
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@@ -36,20 +36,12 @@ interface AuthState {
* Register HTTP Basic Auth middleware with session cookies and rate limiting.
* Only active when CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set.
*
* @param getTunnelRunning - returns true while a managed tunnel is active. Used
* to gate the `/api/hook-event` localhost bypass: when a tunnel is up, tunneled
* internet traffic reaches the loopback origin with `req.ip === 127.0.0.1`, so
* the bypass additionally requires the shared hook secret (COD-54). When no
* tunnel is running (loopback-only, the normal case) the plain localhost bypass
* is kept so already-deployed (pre-secret) hooks + the loop channel keep working.
* Optional; defaults to "no tunnel" (unchanged behavior) when omitted.
* The `/api/hook-event` + `/api/status-telemetry` localhost bypass requires the
* shared hook secret unconditionally (COD-91) — see the onRequest hook below.
*
* @returns AuthState for lifecycle management (dispose on server stop)
*/
export function registerAuthMiddleware(
app: FastifyInstance,
https: boolean,
getTunnelRunning: () => boolean = () => false
): AuthState {
export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): AuthState {
const state: AuthState = {
authSessions: null,
authFailures: null,
@@ -114,30 +106,26 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(
// COD-54: the bare localhost bypass is unsafe while a tunnel is running, because
// `cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
// loopback origin, so a tunneled request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 and
// would pass. So:
// - tunnel running → bypass requires the shared hook secret (local hooks present
// it via the X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; internet traffic can't know it),
// - tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → keep the plain
// localhost bypass so already-deployed (pre-secret) hooks + the loop's own
// credential-less hook channel keep working.
// would pass. COD-91: require the shared hook secret on the loopback bypass
// UNCONDITIONALLY (not just while the managed tunnel is up). Codeman can't detect
// a user's own loopback reverse proxy (their own `cloudflared --url`, `tailscale
// serve`, nginx → 127.0.0.1), so tunnel-gating left that path with the unsafe plain
// bypass. Managed-session hooks always present the secret (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret,
// from $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE — generated for every instance), so requiring it
// always closes the gap without breaking the legitimate hook channel.
if ((req.url === '/api/hook-event' || req.url === '/api/status-telemetry') && req.method === 'POST') {
const ip = req.ip;
const isLoopback = ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1';
if (isLoopback) {
if (!getTunnelRunning()) {
// Loopback-only: unchanged behavior.
done();
return;
}
// Tunnel up: require the shared secret (constant-time compare).
// Always require the shared secret (constant-time compare).
const presented = Buffer.from(req.headers[HOOK_SECRET_HEADER.toLowerCase()]?.toString() ?? '');
const expected = Buffer.from(getHookSecret());
if (presented.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(presented, expected)) {
done();
return;
}
// Wrong/absent secret while tunneled — rate-limit per IP in the DEDICATED
// hook bucket (never authFailures, which would lock out the login path).
// Wrong/absent secret — rate-limit per IP in the DEDICATED hook bucket
// (never authFailures, which would lock out the login path).
const hookIp = req.ip;
const hookFailures = hookSecretFailures.get(hookIp) ?? 0;
if (hookFailures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
+19 -1
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@@ -45,7 +45,13 @@ import {
validatePathWithinBase,
} from '../route-helpers.js';
import { AUTH_COOKIE_NAME } from '../middleware/auth.js';
import { writeHooksConfig, updateCaseModel, stripCaseEnvKeys, applyStatusLineConfig } from '../../hooks-config.js';
import {
writeHooksConfig,
updateCaseModel,
stripCaseEnvKeys,
applyStatusLineConfig,
refreshStaleHookSecret,
} from '../../hooks-config.js';
import { generateClaudeMd } from '../../templates/claude-md.js';
import { imageWatcher } from '../../image-watcher.js';
import { getLifecycleLog } from '../../session-lifecycle-log.js';
@@ -312,6 +318,13 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
await applyStatusLineConfig(workingDir, true);
}
// COD-91 self-heal: refresh a pre-secret hooks block in an existing case so the now
// unconditional hook-secret gate keeps accepting its hook events. No-op for fresh
// cases (writeHooksConfig already wrote the secret) and for non-Codeman/absent hooks.
if ((body.mode ?? 'claude') === 'claude') {
await refreshStaleHookSecret(workingDir).catch(() => {});
}
// Check OpenCode availability if requested
if (body.mode === 'opencode') {
const { isOpenCodeAvailable } = await import('../../utils/opencode-cli-resolver.js');
@@ -1279,6 +1292,11 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
} catch (err) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, `Failed to create case: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`);
}
} else if (mode !== 'opencode') {
// COD-91 self-heal for an EXISTING case: refresh a pre-secret hooks block so the
// now-unconditional hook-secret gate keeps accepting its hook events. No-op when
// the hooks aren't ours or already carry the secret.
await refreshStaleHookSecret(casePath).catch(() => {});
}
// Strip stale disk entries for keys this request is actively setting (Claude only —
+1 -1
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@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
registerHostGuard(this.app, () => this.getHostPolicy());
// Auth middleware (Basic Auth + session cookies + rate limiting)
const authState = registerAuthMiddleware(this.app, this.https, () => this.tunnelManager.isRunning());
const authState = registerAuthMiddleware(this.app, this.https);
if (authState) {
this.authSessions = authState.authSessions;
this.authFailures = authState.authFailures;