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docs: refresh README + document v0.9.5 security hardening

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README: add a dedicated Security section (always-on Host/Origin
allowlist & DNS-rebinding defense, cross-site CSRF guard, raw
text/plain parser, WebSocket origin validation, XSS-escaped agent
output), plus an Orchestrator Loop section, Agent Teams, and a
More Features section (self-update, dual-CLI, effort/ultracode,
voice, image, gesture, multi-monitor, CJK). Correct stale stats
(tests 1435->2861, 13->15 route modules, 14->16 types, 9->10
config, server.ts 2697->2254, 9->18 frontend modules), fix the
keyboard-shortcut table to match the actual registry (drop the
unbound Ctrl+Enter/Ctrl+K), repoint a moved doc link, add
Orchestrator + self-update API rows, and add Orchestrator/Team
Watcher to the architecture diagram.

security-architecture.md: document the always-on Host-header &
Origin allowlist, text/plain hardening, WebSocket check, XSS
escaping, and CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.

CLAUDE.md: add Host guard / CSRF guard rows + CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.

security review report: add a remediation-status banner (the
pre-fix TL;DR now reads as v0.9.4 state; fixed in c669518).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
arkon
2026-06-09 04:35:29 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 5adf044399
commit 8fc139d671
4 changed files with 168 additions and 20 deletions
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docs/reports/security-review-2026-06-09.md
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# Codeman Security Review — 2026-06-09
> **⚠️ Remediation status (updated 2026‑06‑09):** the two CRITICALs and 5 of the 7
> HIGHs below were **fixed the same day in commit `c669518` (shipped as 0.9.5)** —
> an always‑on `Host`‑header + cross‑site `Origin` allowlist (`registerHostGuard`),
> a raw `text/plain` body parser, a WebSocket `Origin`/`Host` check, and
> HTML‑escaped subagent‑panel sinks. **The present‑tense "is exploitable" wording
> below describes the pre‑fix v0.9.4 state.** Still open: **H2** (the self‑updater
> trusts an unsigned git tag — needs signing infra) and dropping CSP
> `'unsafe-inline'` (needs a nonce migration; H4's escaping already neutralises the
> known XSS). Per‑finding breakdown in the *Implementation status* section below;
> regression tests in `test/network-host-guard.test.ts`.
**Scope:** whole codebase (branch `master`, v0.9.4). Adversarial multi-agent review: 10 dimension specialists → diverse-lens skeptic verification of every finding (HIGH/CRITICAL got 3 independent refutation passes) → completeness-critic sweep. 47 raw findings → **25 survived verification** (+1 from the critic). 22 were refuted (mostly "already inside the OS trust boundary" same-uid claims and doc-accuracy nits). Several exploits were **confirmed live** with `curl` against throwaway test ports.
## TL;DR — the one thing that matters