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chore: version packages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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'aicodeman': minor
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Opt-in multi-user mode (`--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, off by default).
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Named users with individually scrypt-hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json`, per-user case spaces under `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, and ownership scoping of sessions (create/list/delete/mutate, incl. bulk delete), cases, cron jobs + run history, scheduled runs, search, file previews, session history, away digest, subagent/workflow monitors, and real-time SSE/WS streams (including the debounced session/task update path, clipboard, and push notifications). A non-admin's `workingDir` is realpath-confined to their own space at every spawn/link path (session create, quick-start, cron create/fire, scheduled runs, case link/docker-link, docker import). Non-admin users default to Claude's classifier-guarded `--permission-mode auto`; raw shell mode, cron `launchCommand`, skip-permissions, and the Codex/Gemini bypass switches require an explicit per-user `canBypassPermissions` grant (enforced at every spawn site incl. one-shots, plan generation, scheduled runs, and remote launches). Machine-level resources (remote/Docker hosts + host reads, mux sessions, orchestrator, tunnel, self-update, settings) are admin-only. Admin API (`/api/admin/users*`) with one-time passwords, last-admin invariants (validated before any teardown), and an append-only audit log; self-service `/api/me` + password change; a frontend admin Users tab + change-password modal; and `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm` CLI. Also adds a global `auto` Claude startup permission mode. When off, behavior is byte-identical to single-user.
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Auth hardening: the login throttle verifies the password before consulting the per-account failure bucket (a correct password can never be locked out); the `mustChangePassword` lockbox covers the WebSocket terminal; the cookie fast-path re-validates identity against the store each request (so a CLI/admin delete/disable/demote takes effect promptly); a role/grant change revokes the target's sessions. (Known limitation: a bare CLI `codeman users passwd` reset — no delete — does not by itself revoke an already-active cookie until it expires; use `codeman users rm`, the admin API, or a restart to force-revoke.) Data-integrity hardening: the store distinguishes a missing users file from a corrupt/unreadable one (so a transient read error can't overwrite all accounts) and writes via a unique per-process temp file; the earlier fire-and-forget `touchLastLogin` corruption race is serialized.
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Note: multi-user mode separates workspaces for a trusted team; it is not a security boundary between users (all sessions share the host OS account). Pair with Docker cases for real isolation.
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# aicodeman
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# aicodeman
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## 1.5.0
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### Minor Changes
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- 0ab2416: Opt-in multi-user mode (`--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, off by default).
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Named users with individually scrypt-hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json`, per-user case spaces under `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, and ownership scoping of sessions (create/list/delete/mutate, incl. bulk delete), cases, cron jobs + run history, scheduled runs, search, file previews, session history, away digest, subagent/workflow monitors, and real-time SSE/WS streams (including the debounced session/task update path, clipboard, and push notifications). A non-admin's `workingDir` is realpath-confined to their own space at every spawn/link path (session create, quick-start, cron create/fire, scheduled runs, case link/docker-link, docker import). Non-admin users default to Claude's classifier-guarded `--permission-mode auto`; raw shell mode, cron `launchCommand`, skip-permissions, and the Codex/Gemini bypass switches require an explicit per-user `canBypassPermissions` grant (enforced at every spawn site incl. one-shots, plan generation, scheduled runs, and remote launches). Machine-level resources (remote/Docker hosts + host reads, mux sessions, orchestrator, tunnel, self-update, settings) are admin-only. Admin API (`/api/admin/users*`) with one-time passwords, last-admin invariants (validated before any teardown), and an append-only audit log; self-service `/api/me` + password change; a frontend admin Users tab + change-password modal; and `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm` CLI. Also adds a global `auto` Claude startup permission mode. When off, behavior is byte-identical to single-user.
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Auth hardening: the login throttle verifies the password before consulting the per-account failure bucket (a correct password can never be locked out); the `mustChangePassword` lockbox covers the WebSocket terminal; the cookie fast-path re-validates identity against the store each request (so a CLI/admin delete/disable/demote takes effect promptly); a role/grant change revokes the target's sessions. (Known limitation: a bare CLI `codeman users passwd` reset — no delete — does not by itself revoke an already-active cookie until it expires; use `codeman users rm`, the admin API, or a restart to force-revoke.) Data-integrity hardening: the store distinguishes a missing users file from a corrupt/unreadable one (so a transient read error can't overwrite all accounts) and writes via a unique per-process temp file; the earlier fire-and-forget `touchLastLogin` corruption race is serialized.
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Note: multi-user mode separates workspaces for a trusted team; it is not a security boundary between users (all sessions share the host OS account). Pair with Docker cases for real isolation.
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## 1.4.1
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## 1.4.1
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### Patch Changes
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### Patch Changes
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@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ When user says "COM":
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CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
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CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
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**Version**: 1.4.1 (must match `package.json`)
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**Version**: 1.5.0 (must match `package.json`)
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## Project Overview
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## Project Overview
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Generated
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-2
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{
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{
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"version": "1.4.1",
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"version": "1.5.0",
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"lockfileVersion": 3,
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"lockfileVersion": 3,
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"requires": true,
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"requires": true,
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"packages": {
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"packages": {
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"": {
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"": {
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"version": "1.4.1",
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"version": "1.5.0",
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"hasInstallScript": true,
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"hasInstallScript": true,
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"license": "MIT",
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"license": "MIT",
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"workspaces": [
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"workspaces": [
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+1
-1
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{
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{
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"name": "aicodeman",
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"version": "1.4.1",
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"version": "1.5.0",
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"description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
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"description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
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"type": "module",
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"type": "module",
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"main": "dist/index.js",
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"main": "dist/index.js",
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