feat(install): ask for network binding, default to LAN access with password prompt

The loopback-only default was safe but left most installs unreachable from
the devices people actually use. The installer now asks at the end of setup:

1) Any device on your network (0.0.0.0), the default. Prompts for a
   dashboard password (confirmed twice); skipping it requires an explicit
   confirmation and prints a big red warning as the final output.
2) This machine only (127.0.0.1), the safer option, for tunnel/Tailscale
   setups.

The choice flows into the systemd unit, the launchd plist (values escaped
for both formats), the run-now exec path, and the printed URLs (LAN IP
detection included). Non-interactive installs keep the safe loopback
default unless CODEMAN_HOST is preset; the server binary's own default
binding is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-07-24 03:09:43 +02:00
parent 608ec8a10e
commit 715aef2076
2 changed files with 229 additions and 15 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | b
This installs Node.js and tmux if missing, clones Codeman to `~/.codeman/app`, and builds it. A few things worth knowing:
- **It asks first.** Every system change (package installs, AI CLI download) is prompted, and a menu at the end lets you choose: run Codeman in this terminal, install it as a background service (systemd/launchd, auto-start on boot), or don't start yet. Nothing runs in the background unless you pick it.
- **Network or local-only, your choice.** The installer asks whether the dashboard should be reachable from other devices on your network (`0.0.0.0`, the default, with a strongly recommended password prompt) or from this machine only (`127.0.0.1`, safest). Skipping the password on a network bind requires an explicit confirmation and ends with a loud warning. A bare `codeman web` started by hand still defaults to loopback.
- **Re-run to update.** The same one-liner updates a finished install in place: local changes in `~/.codeman/app` are stashed (never discarded), and a running service is restarted and verified. If a first install was interrupted, re-running resumes the full setup instead. `install.sh update` and `install.sh uninstall` also exist.
- **CI / headless:** without a terminal attached, steps that would change your system abort with instructions instead of running silently. Set `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` to approve them for automation.
@@ -590,7 +591,7 @@ By default Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so t
### Network & access
- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Loopback by default** — the server binary binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box (the guided installer asks about network access and configures the binding + password for you). Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log)
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
- **Configurable permission mode** - `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is only the default. **App Settings → Claude CLI → Startup Mode** can switch new sessions to Anthropic's classifier-guarded `auto` mode (low-prompt, needs Claude Code 2.1.207+), `normal` prompting, or an explicit allowed-tools list. In multi-user mode, non-granted users are forced to `auto`, and shell sessions / skip-permissions require an explicit per-user grant