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fix(files): serve remote-case attachments, the path a click takes outside the case

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A clicked path that points OUTSIDE the case directory goes through the attachment
routes (the frontend's `_isExternalPreviewPath` sends every absolute path not under
`workingDir` to `POST /attachments`), and those had the same local-`fs` assumption
as file-raw: `realpathSync`/`fs.stat` on a path that only exists on the remote host,
so the file never opened — the case the #415 report was actually about.

- `registerExternalAttachment()` accepts `remote` and resolves through
  `remoteProbePaths` (canonical path, size/mtime, kind, plus the workspace root for
  the confinement check). Everything around it — blocklist, extension allowlist,
  workspace confinement, registry/dedupe — is now shared by both branches, so the
  remote path cannot drift from the local one.
- The by-id routes (`raw`, `preview`, `thumbnail`), the metadata poll and the
  attachment history list resolve over ssh too. `raw` streams with the same
  Range contract as file-raw; `preview` (office) and `thumbnail` answer 400 for a
  remote record; an unreachable host answers 502, a vanished file 404.
- Which host a record is read from follows the SESSION, never the path string: the
  same absolute path is a different file on each host, and a remote session never
  falls back to a local file with that name.
- Codex generated artifacts keep force-workspace confinement for a remote case: the
  well-known artifact directories are anchored at THIS host's home, so only a file
  inside the remote workspace is trusted.

Still local-only by design: writes, office conversion, thumbnails, the file
tree/picker and tail-file.
This commit is contained in:
Randalix
2026-09-14 17:06:42 +02:00
parent 013a5d9cc8
commit 63aafdf274
10 changed files with 566 additions and 86 deletions
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docs/architecture-invariants.md
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@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Model is NOT a session field: it is a composition entry in the profile's config
### Remote SSH cases
**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket** `-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, external attachment registration, `tail-file`. Tests: `test/remote-files.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-remote.test.ts`.
**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket** `-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. This covers the ATTACHMENT routes too, which is the half a clicked path needs when the file is OUTSIDE the case directory (`_isExternalPreviewPath` sends it to `POST …/attachments`): registration, by-id `raw`, metadata and the history list all resolve over ssh (`registerExternalAttachment({remote})`, `resolveServableRemoteAttachment`), and what decides the host is the SESSION, never the path string — the same absolute path means a different file on each host. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, `tail-file`. Tests: `test/remote-files.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-remote.test.ts`.
### Docker cases
docs/remote-sessions.md
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@@ -267,6 +267,14 @@ and it follows the same rule as the launch path: every ssh command line comes fr
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-content` | `cat` into memory, capped by the existing text limit; `edit=1` answers `400` (see below) and `editable` is always `false` |
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-preview` | Non-office files redirect to `file-raw` (which works remotely); docx/pptx answer `400` |
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-thumbnail` | `400` for remote files |
| `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` | Registers an absolute path that lives on the **remote** host (a clicked link pointing outside the case directory) by probing it there |
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw` | Streams the registered remote file over ssh, same 200/206/416 contract; `preview` (office) and `thumbnail` answer `400` |
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId`, `GET …/attachments` (history) | Size/mtime/existence resolved over ssh, so a remote entry is not reported `missing` |
⚠️ The attachment route is the one a clicked path takes when it is **outside** the case
directory (a remote `/tmp` scratchpad capture, a screenshot elsewhere in the home dir):
the frontend's `_isExternalPreviewPath()` sends every absolute path that is not under
`workingDir` there, so fixing only `file-raw` would leave exactly that half broken.
Guard order is deliberately **the same as locally**, and the checks are not weakened
by the transport:
@@ -305,11 +313,16 @@ still has it.
**Not available over ssh (by choice, not by accident):** editing a file (writes would
need SFTP; `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md` §6), office-document previews and
generated thumbnails (both need the bytes on the server's disk — no remote file is ever
spilled onto the server), the file-tree/picker listings, attachment registration for
paths outside the workspace, and `tail-file`. Those routes are still local-only, so
with an `sshfs` mount in place they read the mounted copy — the two views can only
disagree when that mount is stale. Docker cases are unaffected: their workspace is
bind-mounted at the same absolute path, so local `fs` reads real bytes.
spilled onto the server), the file-tree/picker listings, and `tail-file`. Those routes
are still local-only, so with an `sshfs` mount in place they read the mounted copy —
the two views can only disagree when that mount is stale. Docker cases are unaffected:
their workspace is bind-mounted at the same absolute path, so local `fs` reads real bytes.
⚠️ A remote record stores the **remote** path, and the same absolute path STRING means a
different file on each host. What decides which host to read is therefore never the
path but the SESSION (`session.remote`): a remote session never falls back to local
`fs`, and a local session never opens an ssh connection — including for attachment
records, which are keyed to the session that registered them.
## API