docs: add pi to the mode lists the sixth-backend sweep missed

PR #282 added pi across the prominent surfaces but left the enumerations
that read as exhaustive: the env-prefix allowlist (missing PI_*), the
external-CLI list for stop/blocked, cron's agent types (also missing
antigravity), the narrow-strip mode list, and the claude-only caveats in the
cron and Read My Mind guides. Both READMEs and the four affected docs now agree
with the schema.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-08-13 19:40:54 +02:00
parent a7928f5c64
commit 4bbe2b7ff6
7 changed files with 13 additions and 13 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ These run for **every** request — before auth, even on the default no-password
### Input, files & headers ### Input, files & headers
- **Schema-validated inputs** — every API body is checked with Zod v4 schemas; a `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `ANTIGRAVITY_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` env-prefix allowlist gates which settings each CLI can receive - **Schema-validated inputs** — every API body is checked with Zod v4 schemas; a `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `ANTIGRAVITY_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` / `PI_*` env-prefix allowlist gates which settings each CLI can receive
- **Path containment** — file routes `realpath` before boundary checks (no TOCTOU); `..`, absolute paths, and symlinks resolving outside the working dir are rejected. Caps: 10 MB text preview / 50 MB raw & download; `/api/download` blocklists sensitive paths (`.env`, `*credentials*`, `~/.ssh/`, `.aws/credentials`). SVG/HTML is served `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment so it downloads rather than executes - **Path containment** — file routes `realpath` before boundary checks (no TOCTOU); `..`, absolute paths, and symlinks resolving outside the working dir are rejected. Caps: 10 MB text preview / 50 MB raw & download; `/api/download` blocklists sensitive paths (`.env`, `*credentials*`, `~/.ssh/`, `.aws/credentials`). SVG/HTML is served `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment so it downloads rather than executes
- **Security headers** — `Content-Security-Policy` (`default-src 'self'`, every exception enumerated), `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, HSTS over HTTPS, and CORS reflected **only** for `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1` - **Security headers** — `Content-Security-Policy` (`default-src 'self'`, every exception enumerated), `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, HSTS over HTTPS, and CORS reflected **only** for `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ When a CLI runs in a Codeman-managed session, these environment variables are se
4. **Response envelope.** Most endpoints return `{ "success": true, "data": … }` (errors: `{ "success": false, "error", "errorCode" }`). A few legacy GETs return bare bodies — **handle both** (`body.data ?? body`). 4. **Response envelope.** Most endpoints return `{ "success": true, "data": … }` (errors: `{ "success": false, "error", "errorCode" }`). A few legacy GETs return bare bodies — **handle both** (`body.data ?? body`).
5. **`/api/v1/*`** is a stable alias of `/api/*`. 5. **`/api/v1/*`** is a stable alias of `/api/*`.
6. **Wait instead of polling, and don't treat a timeout as an error.** The wait endpoints answer with HTTP `200` and `wait.timedOut: true` when nothing happened in time, so loop over short waits (60s is the default) rather than issuing one long call, because tunnels cut idle connections. `wait.timeoutMs` tells you the timeout the server actually applied after clamping (600s ceiling). 6. **Wait instead of polling, and don't treat a timeout as an error.** The wait endpoints answer with HTTP `200` and `wait.timedOut: true` when nothing happened in time, so loop over short waits (60s is the default) rather than issuing one long call, because tunnels cut idle connections. `wait.timeoutMs` tells you the timeout the server actually applied after clamping (600s ceiling).
7. **Only `claude` sessions emit `stop` and `blocked`.** Those two come from Claude Code hooks; `shell` and the external CLIs (opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity) accept only `idle`, `working` and `exit`. Asking for `stop` explicitly on those is a `400`; omitting `until` is always safe. ⚠️ On a `shell` session `idle` fires **once**, at startup, and never again, so send-and-wait there can only time out; synchronize hook-less sessions with a `wait-output` marker. 7. **Only `claude` sessions emit `stop` and `blocked`.** Those two come from Claude Code hooks; `shell` and the external CLIs (opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity/pi) accept only `idle`, `working` and `exit`. Asking for `stop` explicitly on those is a `400`; omitting `until` is always safe. ⚠️ On a `shell` session `idle` fires **once**, at startup, and never again, so send-and-wait there can only time out; synchronize hook-less sessions with a `wait-output` marker.
8. **Nothing reports "ready", so wait for it explicitly.** A new session answers `{"signal":"exit","immediate":true}` (that means *not started*, not *crashed*) until its PID exists, and a `claude` worker in a fresh case then sits on the CLI's trust dialog. Prompt it there and the wait resolves on `idle` in ~2s looking exactly like a finished turn, while the text sits stuck in the dialog. Recipe 2b below is the sequence that avoids it. 8. **Nothing reports "ready", so wait for it explicitly.** A new session answers `{"signal":"exit","immediate":true}` (that means *not started*, not *crashed*) until its PID exists, and a `claude` worker in a fresh case then sits on the CLI's trust dialog. Prompt it there and the wait resolves on `idle` in ~2s looking exactly like a finished turn, while the text sits stuck in the dialog. Recipe 2b below is the sequence that avoids it.
### Recipes ### Recipes
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@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ Codeman 默认用 `--dangerously-skip-permissions` 启动会话,因此 Web UI
### 输入、文件与响应头 ### 输入、文件与响应头
- **模式校验的输入** —— 每个 API 请求体都用 Zod v4 模式检查;一个 `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `ANTIGRAVITY_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` 环境变量前缀允许列表把控每个 CLI 能接收哪些设置 - **模式校验的输入** —— 每个 API 请求体都用 Zod v4 模式检查;一个 `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `ANTIGRAVITY_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` / `PI_*` 环境变量前缀允许列表把控每个 CLI 能接收哪些设置
- **路径限定** —— 文件路由在边界检查前先 `realpath`(无 TOCTOU);`..`、绝对路径、以及解析到工作目录之外的符号链接都会被拒绝。上限:10 MB 文本预览 / 50 MB 原始与下载;`/api/download` 对敏感路径(`.env`、`*credentials*`、`~/.ssh/`、`.aws/credentials`)做黑名单。SVG/HTML 以 `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment 提供,因此会被下载而非执行 - **路径限定** —— 文件路由在边界检查前先 `realpath`(无 TOCTOU);`..`、绝对路径、以及解析到工作目录之外的符号链接都会被拒绝。上限:10 MB 文本预览 / 50 MB 原始与下载;`/api/download` 对敏感路径(`.env`、`*credentials*`、`~/.ssh/`、`.aws/credentials`)做黑名单。SVG/HTML 以 `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment 提供,因此会被下载而非执行
- **安全响应头** —— `Content-Security-Policy`(`default-src 'self'`,每个例外都逐条列举)、`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`、`X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`、HTTPS 下的 HSTS,以及**仅**对 `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1` 反射的 CORS - **安全响应头** —— `Content-Security-Policy`(`default-src 'self'`,每个例外都逐条列举)、`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`、`X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`、HTTPS 下的 HSTS,以及**仅**对 `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1` 反射的 CORS
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ sc -l # 列出会话
4. **响应信封。** 多数端点返回 `{ "success": true, "data": … }`(错误:`{ "success": false, "error", "errorCode" }`)。少数遗留 GET 返回裸响应体 —— **两种都要处理**(`body.data ?? body`)。 4. **响应信封。** 多数端点返回 `{ "success": true, "data": … }`(错误:`{ "success": false, "error", "errorCode" }`)。少数遗留 GET 返回裸响应体 —— **两种都要处理**(`body.data ?? body`)。
5. **`/api/v1/*`** 是 `/api/*` 的稳定别名。 5. **`/api/v1/*`** 是 `/api/*` 的稳定别名。
6. **用等待代替轮询,别把超时当成错误。** 等待类端点在没等到事情发生时也以 HTTP `200` 加 `wait.timedOut: true` 应答,所以要循环调用短等待(默认 60 秒),而不是发一个超长的调用:隧道会掐断空闲连接。`wait.timeoutMs` 告诉你服务端钳制之后真正采用的超时(上限 600 秒)。 6. **用等待代替轮询,别把超时当成错误。** 等待类端点在没等到事情发生时也以 HTTP `200` 加 `wait.timedOut: true` 应答,所以要循环调用短等待(默认 60 秒),而不是发一个超长的调用:隧道会掐断空闲连接。`wait.timeoutMs` 告诉你服务端钳制之后真正采用的超时(上限 600 秒)。
7. **只有 `claude` 会话会发出 `stop` 与 `blocked`。** 这两个来自 Claude Code hook;`shell` 与外部 CLI(opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity)只接受 `idle`、`working` 与 `exit`。在这些模式上显式索要 `stop` 会得到 `400`;不传 `until` 则永远安全。⚠️ `shell` 会话的 `idle` 只在启动时触发**一次**,此后再也不会,所以在那里用「发送并等待」只能等到超时:没有 hook 的会话请用 `wait-output` 标记来同步。 7. **只有 `claude` 会话会发出 `stop` 与 `blocked`。** 这两个来自 Claude Code hook;`shell` 与外部 CLI(opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity/pi)只接受 `idle`、`working` 与 `exit`。在这些模式上显式索要 `stop` 会得到 `400`;不传 `until` 则永远安全。⚠️ `shell` 会话的 `idle` 只在启动时触发**一次**,此后再也不会,所以在那里用「发送并等待」只能等到超时:没有 hook 的会话请用 `wait-output` 标记来同步。
8. **没有任何东西会报告「就绪」,得自己显式等。** 新会话在 PID 出现之前一律回答 `{"signal":"exit","immediate":true}`(意思是*还没启动*,不是*崩了*),而全新 case 里的 `claude` 工作会话接着会停在 CLI 的信任对话框上。此时给它发提示,等待会在约 2 秒后因 `idle` 解除,看上去和一个跑完的回合一模一样,而文本其实卡在对话框里。下面的配方 2b 就是避开它的顺序。 8. **没有任何东西会报告「就绪」,得自己显式等。** 新会话在 PID 出现之前一律回答 `{"signal":"exit","immediate":true}`(意思是*还没启动*,不是*崩了*),而全新 case 里的 `claude` 工作会话接着会停在 CLI 的信任对话框上。此时给它发提示,等待会在约 2 秒后因 `idle` 解除,看上去和一个跑完的回合一模一样,而文本其实卡在对话框里。下面的配方 2b 就是避开它的顺序。
### 常用配方 ### 常用配方
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
done done
printf '%s\n' "$TXT" printf '%s\n' "$TXT"
# 5b. 其他模式(shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity)没有 transcript,读终端。 # 5b. 其他模式(shell/opencode/gemini/antigravity/pi)没有 transcript,读终端。
# ⚠️ 用 terminal?tail=,不要用 /output:后者的 textOutput 对每个由 tmux 承载的 # ⚠️ 用 terminal?tail=,不要用 /output:后者的 textOutput 对每个由 tmux 承载的
# (也就是每个交互式)会话都是空的。tail 按字节计,返回的是含 ANSI 的终端数据。 # (也就是每个交互式)会话都是空的。tail 按字节计,返回的是含 ANSI 的终端数据。
curl -s "$API/api/sessions/$SID/terminal?tail=8000" | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer' curl -s "$API/api/sessions/$SID/terminal?tail=8000" | jq -r '.data.terminalBuffer'
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ a genuine tunnel failure looks like, and `204` cannot carry `waitedMs` / `status
**2. `stop` and `blocked` fire only for `claude` sessions.** Both come from Claude **2. `stop` and `blocked` fire only for `claude` sessions.** Both come from Claude
Code hooks, and no other mode installs them: `shell` runs no agent, and the external Code hooks, and no other mode installs them: `shell` runs no agent, and the external
CLIs (`opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`) render their own TUIs and post CLIs (`opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`, `antigravity`, `pi`) render their own TUIs and post
no hooks. For every non-`claude` mode only `idle`, `working` and `exit` are no hooks. For every non-`claude` mode only `idle`, `working` and `exit` are
accepted, and of those only `exit` is dependable: see the caveats under accepted, and of those only `exit` is dependable: see the caveats under
[Signals](#signals) before building on `idle`. Requesting `stop` or `blocked` [Signals](#signals) before building on `idle`. Requesting `stop` or `blocked`
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@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Implementation detail extracted from `CLAUDE.md` so that file stays small enough
### Cron jobs ### Cron jobs
**Cron (cron-style `CronJob`s)**: saved, named jobs with a recurring schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`), enable/disable, Run Now, next-run calc, and per-job run history (`CronJobRun`). ⚠️ **Distinct from the legacy `ScheduledRun`** (`/api/scheduled`, a run-now duration-bounded autonomous loop) — the two never interact; the legacy concept keeps the `Scheduled*` names, the recurring-job feature is `Cron*`. `CronService` (`src/cron/cron-service.ts`) owns CRUD + the 30s background due-tick (`tickDueJobs`, registered via `cleanup.setInterval` in `server.ts`; `init()` recomputes nextRunAt on boot) and **reuses the existing session layer** (create → `addSession` → `setupSessionListeners` → `startInteractive`/`startShell` → prompt via `writeViaMux`/`write`) rather than rebuilding tmux logic. Next-run math is pure/unit-tested in `cron-time.ts` (SERVER-LOCAL timezone for daily/weekly). Dup-launch guard = `lastDueKey` (jobId:fireTime); schedule is advanced BEFORE launch so a slow launch can't re-trigger. `once` jobs self-disable after firing (`completedOnce`). Persisted via `AppState.cronJobs`/`cronJobRuns` (StateStore accessors). Routes `/api/cron/jobs*` + `/api/cron/runs` (`cron-routes.ts`, `CronPort`); schema `CronJobSchema` (cross-field `superRefine`; the `.partial()` update schema does NOT re-run it); SSE `cron:*`. Frontend `cron-ui.js` (#cronModal). Claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini agent types. Tests: `test/cron-time.test.ts`, `test/cron-service.test.ts`. Design: `docs/cron-discovery.md`. **Cron (cron-style `CronJob`s)**: saved, named jobs with a recurring schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`), enable/disable, Run Now, next-run calc, and per-job run history (`CronJobRun`). ⚠️ **Distinct from the legacy `ScheduledRun`** (`/api/scheduled`, a run-now duration-bounded autonomous loop) — the two never interact; the legacy concept keeps the `Scheduled*` names, the recurring-job feature is `Cron*`. `CronService` (`src/cron/cron-service.ts`) owns CRUD + the 30s background due-tick (`tickDueJobs`, registered via `cleanup.setInterval` in `server.ts`; `init()` recomputes nextRunAt on boot) and **reuses the existing session layer** (create → `addSession` → `setupSessionListeners` → `startInteractive`/`startShell` → prompt via `writeViaMux`/`write`) rather than rebuilding tmux logic. Next-run math is pure/unit-tested in `cron-time.ts` (SERVER-LOCAL timezone for daily/weekly). Dup-launch guard = `lastDueKey` (jobId:fireTime); schedule is advanced BEFORE launch so a slow launch can't re-trigger. `once` jobs self-disable after firing (`completedOnce`). Persisted via `AppState.cronJobs`/`cronJobRuns` (StateStore accessors). Routes `/api/cron/jobs*` + `/api/cron/runs` (`cron-routes.ts`, `CronPort`); schema `CronJobSchema` (cross-field `superRefine`; the `.partial()` update schema does NOT re-run it); SSE `cron:*`. Frontend `cron-ui.js` (#cronModal). Claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity/pi agent types. Tests: `test/cron-time.test.ts`, `test/cron-service.test.ts`. Design: `docs/cron-discovery.md`.
### Unified session list and Session Manager ### Unified session list and Session Manager
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Implementation detail extracted from `CLAUDE.md` so that file stays small enough
### Terminal scrollback: strip flavors and wheel/touch forwarding ### Terminal scrollback: strip flavors and wheel/touch forwarding
**Two strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. Every other mode (shell/opencode/antigravity) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same narrow branch; the frontend `_sessionUsesServerMouseStrip()` mirror stays claude/codex/gemini because only the FULL strip touches mouse DECSETs. The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for both flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`. **Two strip flavors, one carry** (#205, `session.ts:_handleTerminalOutput`): the FULL strip (`isAltScreenStripMode` = codex/claude/gemini) removes alt-screen toggles, `3J`, and mouse-tracking DECSETs. Every other mode (shell/opencode/antigravity/pi) gets the NARROW strip (`isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode`) — alt-screen toggles ONLY — and only when tmux-backed (`useMux`). Rationale: the tmux CLIENT emits `smcup` as its first bytes at attach, before any program runs, parking xterm in the scrollback-less alternate buffer for the whole session (touch scrolling no-ops; xterm's own wheel handler converts the wheel to Up/Down arrows = readline history cycling — both #205 symptoms). tmux never forwards a pane program's alt-screen toggles to its client (it repaints instead; measured — vim/less inside a pane emit zero to the client), so the only thing the narrow strip ever removes is tmux's own smcup. It keeps `3J` (a user's `clear` is a deliberate scrollback wipe) and the mouse DECSETs (tmux passes those through even with `mouse off`; stripping them would break htop/vim mouse support). ⚠️ The `useMux` gate is load-bearing: `startShell()`/`startInteractive()` fall back to a DIRECT PTY when mux creation fails, and there the inner program's own `?1049h` really does reach xterm — stripping it would break vim/less/htop for real. The replay path (`session-routes.ts`, via `session.usesMux`) applies the same narrow branch; the frontend `_sessionUsesServerMouseStrip()` mirror stays claude/codex/gemini because only the FULL strip touches mouse DECSETs. The chunk-boundary carry (`_altScreenSeqCarry`) runs for both flavors. Tests: `test/claude-scrollback-strip.test.ts`.
**Only claude ≥ 2.1.187 forwards the wheel; every other mode scrolls local scrollback** (#227 follow-up, `terminal-ui.js:_shouldForwardWheelToApp`). Codex was in the forward list until a reporter hit a completely dead wheel in codex tabs while the scrollbar drag worked. Measured against codex-cli 0.147.0 in a bare tmux: it never enables mouse tracking (`mouse_any_flag=0`) and SGR wheel reports fed to its PTY change nothing on screen, because it runs an INLINE viewport (`alternate_on=0`) and pushes its transcript into the terminal's own scrollback (tmux `history_size` grows) instead of paging in-app. So for codex, local scrollback IS the transcript and forwarding swallowed every tick. ⚠️ "The TUI is a strip mode" is NOT evidence that it consumes wheel reports — verify with a real `\x1b[<64;c;rM` write into a live pane before adding a mode here. Hand-encoded SGR TAPS stay enabled for codex (`_sessionUsesServerMouseStrip`); measured, they are no-ops that insert nothing, so click-to-position is simply unavailable there rather than harmful. **Only claude ≥ 2.1.187 forwards the wheel; every other mode scrolls local scrollback** (#227 follow-up, `terminal-ui.js:_shouldForwardWheelToApp`). Codex was in the forward list until a reporter hit a completely dead wheel in codex tabs while the scrollbar drag worked. Measured against codex-cli 0.147.0 in a bare tmux: it never enables mouse tracking (`mouse_any_flag=0`) and SGR wheel reports fed to its PTY change nothing on screen, because it runs an INLINE viewport (`alternate_on=0`) and pushes its transcript into the terminal's own scrollback (tmux `history_size` grows) instead of paging in-app. So for codex, local scrollback IS the transcript and forwarding swallowed every tick. ⚠️ "The TUI is a strip mode" is NOT evidence that it consumes wheel reports — verify with a real `\x1b[<64;c;rM` write into a live pane before adding a mode here. Hand-encoded SGR TAPS stay enabled for codex (`_sessionUsesServerMouseStrip`); measured, they are no-ops that insert nothing, so click-to-position is simply unavailable there rather than harmful.
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ Anatomy: `.set-shell` → `.set-shell-head` (title + `.set-head-actions`) + `.se
| **Rate limit** | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). QR has separate limiter | | **Rate limit** | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). QR has separate limiter |
| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` (env, COD-55) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9): the welcome/settings tunnel toggle pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, resends with that flag (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted | | **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` (env, COD-55) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9): the welcome/settings tunnel toggle pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, resends with that flag (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted |
| **Env vars** | `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies, comma-separated; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains), `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS`=1 (opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway so in-container hooks reach a loopback-bound server; bind IP from `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST` or auto-detect) | | **Env vars** | `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies, comma-separated; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains), `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS`=1 (opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway so in-container hooks reach a loopback-bound server; bind IP from `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST` or auto-detect) |
| **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`) | | **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`/`PI_*`) |
| **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS | | **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS |
## Performance and limits ## Performance and limits
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Cron Jobs — User & Operator Guide # Cron Jobs — User & Operator Guide
Codeman's **Cron** feature lets you save named, recurring jobs that automatically Codeman's **Cron** feature lets you save named, recurring jobs that automatically
spin up a Claude (or shell / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini) session on a schedule and spin up a Claude (or shell / OpenCode / Codex / Antigravity / Gemini / Pi) session on a schedule and
feed it a prompt. Think "cron for agent sessions": _"every weekday at 3am, open a feed it a prompt. Think "cron for agent sessions": _"every weekday at 3am, open a
Claude session in `~/proj` and tell it to update dependencies and open a PR."_ Claude session in `~/proj` and tell it to update dependencies and open a PR."_
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@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ Every one of these has cost somebody real time.
a multi-word match is unreliable there. Match one short space-free token, ideally a multi-word match is unreliable there. Match one short space-free token, ideally
one you printed yourself, and keep it out of the typed line (your own keystrokes one you printed yourself, and keep it out of the typed line (your own keystrokes
echo into the stream). echo into the stream).
- **`stop` and `blocked` never fire for `shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini` or - **`stop` and `blocked` never fire for `shell`, `opencode`, `codex`, `gemini`,
`antigravity` sessions.** They come from Claude Code hooks, which no other mode `antigravity` or `pi` sessions.** They come from Claude Code hooks, which no other mode
installs, so only `idle`, `working` and `exit` exist there. Asking for them installs, so only `idle`, `working` and `exit` exist there. Asking for them
explicitly is a `400`; omitting `until` is safe, since the server drops them from explicitly is a `400`; omitting `until` is safe, since the server drops them from
the default set and echoes what it actually waited on as `wait.until`. Even in the default set and echoes what it actually waited on as `wait.until`. Even in
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ A prediction takes 5-90 seconds and costs real tokens; one runs per session at a
Capture reads the Claude session transcript, not your keystrokes: when a user turn lands in the transcript, its text is folded into the case's profile. Filters applied on the way in: Capture reads the Claude session transcript, not your keystrokes: when a user turn lands in the transcript, its text is folded into the case's profile. Filters applied on the way in:
- **Claude-mode sessions only.** Shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, and Antigravity sessions are never captured (they have no transcript watcher). - **Claude-mode sessions only.** Shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, and Pi sessions are never captured (they have no transcript watcher).
- Tool results, local slash-command echo (`/model` and friends), system wrappers, and interrupt markers are skipped. - Tool results, local slash-command echo (`/model` and friends), system wrappers, and interrupt markers are skipped.
- Entries shorter than 3 characters are skipped (menu digits, Esc artifacts). - Entries shorter than 3 characters are skipped (menu digits, Esc artifacts).
- Consecutive duplicates collapse (auto-resume's "continue" spam counts once per run). - Consecutive duplicates collapse (auto-resume's "continue" spam counts once per run).