Merge PR #146 from aakhter/cod-163-command-palette: searchable case picker + Command-K session palette

Includes review fixes: Session Manager aligned to the merged /api/sessions/unified contract with error states, Ctrl+K no longer leaks 0x0B into the PTY, shortcut registry finished (dispatch/persistence/rendering), shortcutOverrides preserved across settings saves, help modal kept reachable.

# Conflicts:
#	README.md
#	src/web/public/index.html
#	src/web/public/session-ui.js
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-07-12 20:03:53 +02:00
14 changed files with 2711 additions and 194 deletions
+131 -119
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ codeman web
<summary><strong>Run as a background service</strong></summary>
**Linux (systemd):**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service << EOF
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER
```
**macOS (launchd):**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
EOF
launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist
```
</details>
<details>
@@ -104,6 +107,7 @@ wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/i
```
Codeman requires tmux, so Windows users need [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install). If you don't have WSL yet: run `wsl --install` in an admin PowerShell, reboot, open Ubuntu, then install your preferred AI coding CLI inside WSL ([Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)). After installing, `http://localhost:3000` is accessible from your Windows browser.
</details>
---
@@ -127,12 +131,12 @@ Open the printed URL. The page is a single dashboard; everything below happens t
Click **+ New Session** (or **Quick Start**). A session is one AI CLI running in its own tmux-backed terminal. You choose:
| Field | What it does |
|-------|--------------|
| **Working directory / case** | The folder the agent operates in. A "case" is just a named working dir Codeman remembers. |
| **CLI / run mode** | `Claude` (default), `OpenCode`, `Codex`, `Gemini`, or `Terminal` (plain shell). |
| **Model** | Per-session model (App Settings → Claude Model). A soft default — `/model` still works in-session. |
| **Effort / Ultracode** | Reasoning effort (`low`–`max`) or `ultracode` for dynamic multi-agent workflows. Switchable anytime with `/effort`. |
| Field | What it does |
| ---------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Working directory / case** | The folder the agent operates in. A "case" is just a named working dir Codeman remembers. |
| **CLI / run mode** | `Claude` (default), `OpenCode`, `Codex`, `Gemini`, or `Terminal` (plain shell). |
| **Model** | Per-session model (App Settings → Claude Model). A soft default — `/model` still works in-session. |
| **Effort / Ultracode** | Reasoning effort (`low`–`max`) or `ultracode` for dynamic multi-agent workflows. Switchable anytime with `/effort`. |
Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your browser over SSE.
@@ -151,13 +155,13 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
### 5. Make it autonomous
| Mode | Use it for | Where |
|------|-----------|-------|
| **Respawn** | Long unattended runs — auto-restarts the CLI on idle/limit, with adaptive timing. Presets: `solo-work`, `overnight-autonomous`, … | Respawn tab |
| **Ralph / Todo** | A self-driving loop that tracks a todo list and keeps working until done. | Ralph tab |
| **Orchestrator** | Turn one goal into a phased plan and drive it to completion across agents. | Orchestrator panel |
| **Cron** | Saved, named jobs on a schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`) that spawn a session and send a prompt when due. | ⏰ Cron button |
| **Auto-resume** | Automatically continue after a subscription rate-limit resets. | Respawn tab (top) |
| Mode | Use it for | Where |
| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ |
| **Respawn** | Long unattended runs — auto-restarts the CLI on idle/limit, with adaptive timing. Presets: `solo-work`, `overnight-autonomous`, … | Respawn tab |
| **Ralph / Todo** | A self-driving loop that tracks a todo list and keeps working until done. | Ralph tab |
| **Orchestrator** | Turn one goal into a phased plan and drive it to completion across agents. | Orchestrator panel |
| **Cron** | Saved, named jobs on a schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`) that spawn a session and send a prompt when due. | ⏰ Cron button |
| **Auto-resume** | Automatically continue after a subscription rate-limit resets. | Respawn tab (top) |
### 6. Reach it from anywhere
@@ -171,7 +175,7 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
- **Self-update** — git-clone installs update in place from **Settings → Updates**.
- **Deploy your own changes** — see [Development](#development).
> ⚠️ **Safety:** if you're working *inside* a Codeman-managed session (`echo $CODEMAN_MUX` → `1`), never run `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` directly — use the web UI or `./scripts/tmux-manager.sh`.
> ⚠️ **Safety:** if you're working _inside_ a Codeman-managed session (`echo $CODEMAN_MUX` → `1`), never run `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` directly — use the web UI or `./scripts/tmux-manager.sh`.
---
@@ -281,7 +285,7 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE →
```
- **Multi-layer idle detection** — completion messages, AI-powered idle check, output silence, token stability
- **Auto-resume on usage limit** *(opt-in, off by default)* — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab
- **Auto-resume on usage limit** _(opt-in, off by default)_ — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab
- **Circuit breaker** — prevents respawn thrashing when Claude is stuck (CLOSED -> HALF_OPEN -> OPEN states, tracks consecutive no-progress and repeated errors)
- **Health scoring** — 0-100 health score with component scores for cycle success, circuit breaker state, iteration progress, and stuck recovery
- **Built-in presets** — `solo-work` (3s idle, 60min), `subagent-workflow` (45s, 240min), `team-lead` (90s, 480min), `ralph-todo` (8s, 480min), `overnight-autonomous` (10s, 480min)
@@ -327,10 +331,10 @@ The title is templated into the served HTML on first byte, so it's correct from
### Smart Token Management
| Threshold | Action | Result |
|-----------|--------|--------|
| Threshold | Action | Result |
| --------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| **110k tokens** | Auto `/compact` | Context summarized, work continues |
| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` |
| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` |
### Notifications
@@ -365,8 +369,8 @@ PTY Output → 16ms Server Batch → DEC 2026 Wrap → SSE → Client rAF → xt
- **Effort & Ultracode** — set a per-session default effort (`low`–`max`) or enable **ultracode** (dynamic multi-agent workflows). Soft defaults only — switchable anytime with `/effort` in-session. Extended-thinking budget is configurable too
- **Voice input** — dictate prompts with Deepgram Nova-3 (Web Speech API fallback): toggle recording, auto-silence stop, live level meter (`Ctrl+Shift+V`)
- **Image input** — paste or drag-and-drop images straight into a session
- **Gesture control** *(opt-in)* — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display
- **Multi-monitor span** *(macOS)* — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam
- **Gesture control** _(opt-in)_ — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display
- **Multi-monitor span** _(macOS)_ — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam
- **CJK / IME input** — full composition support for Chinese / Japanese / Korean
- **OS notifications & hostname-aware titles** — desktop alerts and tab titles are prefixed `codeman:<host>` so multi-host setups stay unambiguous
@@ -439,14 +443,14 @@ Every **60 seconds**, the server automatically rotates to a fresh token. The pre
The design is informed by ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin) (USENIX Security 2025), which found 47 of the top-100 websites vulnerable to QR auth attacks due to 6 critical design flaws across 42 CVEs. Codeman addresses all six:
| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation |
|-------------|------------|
| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail |
| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer |
| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias |
| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR |
| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: *"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"* — real-time QRLjacking detection |
| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies |
| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation |
| ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail |
| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer |
| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias |
| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR |
| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: _"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"_ — real-time QRLjacking detection |
| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies |
#### Timing-Safe Lookup
@@ -471,23 +475,23 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t
#### Threat Coverage
| Threat | Why it doesn't work |
|--------|-------------------|
| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. |
| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. |
| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. |
| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. |
| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. |
| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. |
| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. |
| Threat | Why it doesn't work |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. |
| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. |
| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. |
| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. |
| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. |
| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. |
| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. |
#### How It Compares
| Platform | Model | Comparison |
|----------|-------|------------|
| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification |
| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) |
| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it |
| Platform | Model | Comparison |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification |
| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) |
| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it |
> Full design rationale, security analysis, and implementation details: [`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
@@ -495,20 +499,20 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t
## Security
Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control *who* that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control _who_ that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
### Network & access
- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` *starts but prints a loud warning* with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log)
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers *immediately* even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
### Always-on browser hardening (v0.9.5)
These run for **every** request — before auth, even on the default no-password loopback install:
- **Host-header allowlist → blocks DNS rebinding.** A custom domain rebound to `127.0.0.1` is rejected with `403 host not allowed` before any handler runs. Allowed: `localhost`, any IP literal, the bind host, `.ts.net` / `.trycloudflare.com` / `.cfargotunnel.com`, the active managed tunnel, and `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (add custom reverse-proxy domains here — comma-separated; exact host or leading-dot `.suffix` for subdomains)
- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A *missing* Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected
- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A _missing_ Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected
- **Raw `text/plain` bodies.** The global parser no longer JSON-parses `text/plain`, closing the CORS "simple request" CSRF vector where a cross-site `fetch` could smuggle JSON into a write route with no preflight
- **WebSocket origin validation.** The terminal WS upgrade runs the same Host + Origin check and closes with code `4003` on failure (anti-CSWSH)
- **XSS-escaped agent output.** AI-derived strings (tool names, command arguments, subagent descriptions) are HTML-escaped at every injection site before rendering in the subagent / activity panels
@@ -546,37 +550,38 @@ Single-digit selection (1-9), color-coded status, token counts, auto-refresh. De
> Ctrl bindings also accept Cmd on macOS.
| Shortcut | Action |
|----------|--------|
| `Ctrl/Cmd+W` | Kill active session |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+Tab` | Next session |
| `Alt/Option+[` / `Alt/Option+]` | Previous / next session |
| `Alt/Option+1`-`Alt/Option+9` | Switch to tab N (physical keys, so macOS Option layouts work) |
| `Ctrl+Shift+{` / `Ctrl+Shift+}` | Move active tab left / right |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+L` | Clear terminal |
| `Ctrl+Shift+R` | Restore terminal size |
| `Ctrl+Shift+V` | Toggle voice input |
| `Ctrl/Cmd +` / `-` | Font size |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+?` | Keyboard help |
| `Shift+Enter` | Insert newline (sent to terminal) |
| `Escape` | Close panels & modals |
| Shortcut | Action |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+W` | Kill active session |
| `Ctrl/Cmd/Option+K` | Find open session or start a new one |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+Tab` | Next session |
| `Alt/Option+[` / `Alt/Option+]` | Previous / next session |
| `Alt/Option+1`-`Alt/Option+9` | Switch to tab N (physical keys, so macOS Option layouts work) |
| `Ctrl+Shift+{` / `Ctrl+Shift+}` | Move active tab left / right |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+L` | Clear terminal |
| `Ctrl+Shift+R` | Restore terminal size |
| `Ctrl+Shift+V` | Toggle voice input |
| `Ctrl/Cmd +` / `-` | Font size |
| `Ctrl/Cmd+?` | Keyboard help |
| `Shift+Enter` | Insert newline (sent to terminal) |
| `Escape` | Close panels & modals |
---
## Driving Codeman from an Agent — Programmatic Guide
For AI agents and automation that control Codeman without a browser: an agent that spins up worker sessions, a CI bot, or **Claude Code running *inside* a Codeman session orchestrating other sessions**. Everything the UI does is HTTP + a CLI, so an agent can do it too.
For AI agents and automation that control Codeman without a browser: an agent that spins up worker sessions, a CI bot, or **Claude Code running _inside_ a Codeman session orchestrating other sessions**. Everything the UI does is HTTP + a CLI, so an agent can do it too.
### Detect that you're inside Codeman
When a CLI runs in a Codeman-managed session, these environment variables are set — read them instead of hardcoding anything:
| Variable | Meaning |
|----------|---------|
| `CODEMAN_MUX=1` | You're in a managed tmux session. **Never** `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` / `pkill tmux` — you'll kill yourself or a sibling. |
| `CODEMAN_API_URL` | Base URL of the API (e.g. `https://127.0.0.1:3000`). Use it for every call below. |
| `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` | *Your own* session id. Use it to avoid acting on yourself. |
| `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` | Path to the hook secret (required on `/api/hook-event` while a managed tunnel is up). |
| Variable | Meaning |
| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `CODEMAN_MUX=1` | You're in a managed tmux session. **Never** `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` / `pkill tmux` — you'll kill yourself or a sibling. |
| `CODEMAN_API_URL` | Base URL of the API (e.g. `https://127.0.0.1:3000`). Use it for every call below. |
| `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` | _Your own_ session id. Use it to avoid acting on yourself. |
| `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` | Path to the hook secret (required on `/api/hook-event` while a managed tunnel is up). |
### Rules of the road (read before you POST)
@@ -640,7 +645,7 @@ codeman ralph start --min-hours 8 # (r) launch the autonomous loop
codeman attach <path> # attach a Claude hook context
```
### Hooks (events flowing *back* to Codeman)
### Hooks (events flowing _back_ to Codeman)
Codeman registers Claude Code hooks that `POST /api/hook-event` (`permission_prompt`, `idle_prompt`, `stop`, `task_completed`, …) so the dashboard reacts in real time. This endpoint is auth-exempt on loopback but, under a managed tunnel, requires the `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header (read it from `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE`). You normally don't call this by hand — Codeman wires it up — but it's how the autonomy layers "see" what the agent is doing.
@@ -653,62 +658,69 @@ Codeman registers Claude Code hooks that `POST /api/hook-event` (`permission_pro
REST over Fastify — **~160 handlers across 18 route modules**, plus an SSE stream and a WebSocket terminal channel. All responses use the `ApiResponse<T>` envelope (`{success, data}` / `{success, error, errorCode}`); `/api/v1/*` is a stable alias. A representative subset:
### Sessions
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all |
| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session (`{caseName?, mode?, effort?, envOverrides?}`) |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input (`{input, useMux?, clientId?, seq?}` — `clientId`+`seq` = exactly-once) |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/output` | Read terminal output |
| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| -------- | -------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all |
| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session (`{caseName?, mode?, effort?, envOverrides?}`) |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input (`{input, useMux?, clientId?, seq?}` — `clientId`+`seq` = exactly-once) |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/output` | Read terminal output |
| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session |
### Respawn
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | ---------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/enable` | Enable with config + timer |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller |
| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller |
| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config |
### Ralph / Todo
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | -------------------------------- | ---------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking |
### Orchestrator
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/start` | Start orchestration from a goal |
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/approve` | Approve the generated plan |
| `GET` | `/api/orchestrator/status` | Current phase + progress |
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop` | Stop and clean up |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | --------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/start` | Start orchestration from a goal |
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/approve` | Approve the generated plan |
| `GET` | `/api/orchestrator/status` | Current phase + progress |
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop` | Stop and clean up |
### Cron (scheduled jobs)
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` / `POST` | `/api/cron/jobs` | List / create cron jobs |
| `PUT` / `DELETE` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id` | Update / delete a job |
| `PUT` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/enabled` | Enable / disable |
| `POST` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/run` | Run now |
| `GET` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/runs` | Run history |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ---------------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------- |
| `GET` / `POST` | `/api/cron/jobs` | List / create cron jobs |
| `PUT` / `DELETE` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id` | Update / delete a job |
| `PUT` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/enabled` | Enable / disable |
| `POST` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/run` | Run now |
| `GET` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/runs` | Run history |
### Subagents
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript |
| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| -------- | ------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript |
| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process |
### System
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/events` | SSE stream |
| `GET` | `/api/status` | Full app state |
| `POST` | `/api/hook-event` | Hook callbacks |
| `GET` | `/api/system/update/check` | Check for a new release |
| `POST` | `/api/system/update` | Self-update (git-clone installs) |
| `POST` | `/api/clipboard` | Push text to all connected browsers (`{text}`) |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/run-summary` | Timeline + stats |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | ------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/events` | SSE stream |
| `GET` | `/api/status` | Full app state |
| `POST` | `/api/hook-event` | Hook callbacks |
| `GET` | `/api/system/update/check` | Check for a new release |
| `POST` | `/api/system/update` | Self-update (git-clone installs) |
| `POST` | `/api/clipboard` | Push text to all connected browsers (`{text}`) |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/run-summary` | Timeline + stats |
---
@@ -786,14 +798,14 @@ See [CLAUDE.md](./CLAUDE.md) for full documentation.
The codebase went through a comprehensive 7-phase refactoring that eliminated god objects, centralized configuration, and established modular architecture:
| Phase | What changed | Impact |
|-------|-------------|--------|
| **Performance** | Cached endpoints, SSE adaptive batching, buffer chunking | Sub-16ms terminal latency |
| **Route extraction** | `server.ts` split into 15 domain route modules + auth middleware + port interfaces | **−67%** server.ts LOC (6,736 → 2,254) |
| **Domain splitting** | `types.ts` → 16 domain files, `ralph-tracker` → 7 files, `respawn-controller` → 5 files, `session` → 6 files | No more god files |
| **Frontend modules** | `app.js` → 18 extracted modules across infra, domain & feature layers | app.js core down to **~3.4K LOC** |
| **Config consolidation** | ~70 scattered magic numbers → 10 domain-focused config files | Zero cross-file duplicates |
| **Test infrastructure** | Shared mock library, 12 route test files, consolidated MockSession | Testable route handlers via `app.inject()` |
| Phase | What changed | Impact |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------ |
| **Performance** | Cached endpoints, SSE adaptive batching, buffer chunking | Sub-16ms terminal latency |
| **Route extraction** | `server.ts` split into 15 domain route modules + auth middleware + port interfaces | **−67%** server.ts LOC (6,736 → 2,254) |
| **Domain splitting** | `types.ts` → 16 domain files, `ralph-tracker` → 7 files, `respawn-controller` → 5 files, `session` → 6 files | No more god files |
| **Frontend modules** | `app.js` → 18 extracted modules across infra, domain & feature layers | app.js core down to **~3.4K LOC** |
| **Config consolidation** | ~70 scattered magic numbers → 10 domain-focused config files | Zero cross-file duplicates |
| **Test infrastructure** | Shared mock library, 12 route test files, consolidated MockSession | Testable route handlers via `app.inject()` |
Full details: [`docs/archive/code-structure-findings.md`](docs/archive/code-structure-findings.md)