fix(omp): clamp OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL/TOKEN, correct the env-allowlist docs

The docs claimed omp "has no documented vendor-key namespace of its own"
and "the multi-user clamp has nothing to gate" for omp — both false. Per
omp's own docs/environment-variables.md, it reads ~40 provider keys from
env (pi's known 34-key problem in the same shape), and its own knobs are
mostly PI_* (already globally allowlisted): PI_CONFIG_DIR,
PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR, PI_SUBPROCESS_CMD,
PI_SHELL_PREFIX. The first three also move the ~/.omp tree
omp-session-resolver.ts/omp-transcript.ts hardcode, silently degrading
pinning/history — a known gap shared with pi, documented but not fixed
here.

The OMP_* prefix this PR adds brings in OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL/
OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN, where omp resolves credentials from — the same
shape DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL is already dropped for in
clampEnvOverridesForOwner(). Add both to OWNER_CLAMPED_ENV_KEYS so a
non-granted owner in multi-user mode can't redirect them, and correct the
false claims in CLAUDE.md, docs/omp-integration.md, and the stale
resolveOmpHome() comment. Also documents omp's default
tools.approvalMode: yolo, which was previously unstated.

docs/omp-integration.md

@@ -47,12 +47,30 @@ result is interpolated into the pane's spawn command.
 
 **omp reads its own model routing and hooks from `~/.omp`, so no trust or
 permission flags are needed** — unlike every sibling CLI in this family, there is no
-bypass-permissions equivalent to wire up, and the multi-user owner clamp has nothing
+bypass-permissions equivalent to wire up, so `buildOmpCommand()` only ever passes
-to gate for `omp` (no branch needed, no privileged flag exists to strip).
+`--model`/`--resume`/`--continue`. ⚠️ That does NOT mean omp is unrestricted: its
+documented default `tools.approvalMode` is `yolo`, so an omp pane auto-approves exec
+with no flag from Codeman — the CLI's own config, not Codeman, is what would need to
+change that.
 
-Env overrides: the `OMP_*` prefix is allowlisted. omp has no documented vendor-key
+Env overrides: the `OMP_*` prefix is allowlisted, and per omp's own
-namespace of its own (its provider credentials live in `~/.omp` config files, not
+`docs/environment-variables.md` it is not the narrow surface it looks like. omp reads
-environment variables), so nothing beyond `OMP_*` is admitted.
+roughly 40 provider keys from the environment (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `OPENAI_API_KEY`,
+`XAI_API_KEY`, `HF_TOKEN`, ...) — pi's 34-key problem in the same shape — which is why
+none of those get a dedicated allowlist entry; a session authenticates from `~/.omp`
+config or the server process's own env instead, like pi. omp's own documented knobs
+are mostly `PI_*`, not `OMP_*` (`PI_CONFIG_DIR`, `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR`,
+`PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR`, `PI_SUBPROCESS_CMD`, `PI_SHELL_PREFIX`,
+`OMP_PROFILE`/`PI_PROFILE`), and `PI_*` is already allowlisted globally because pi
+mode needs it — so an omp session today already accepts all of those. The first three
+also move the tree `omp-session-resolver.ts` and `omp-transcript.ts` hardcode
+(`resolveOmpHome()` assumes `~/.omp` unconditionally), so pinning and history quietly
+stop working under a redirected config root; this is a known gap, not fixed here.
+
+The `OMP_` prefix itself brings in `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL` / `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN`,
+where omp resolves credentials from — the same shape `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` is dropped
+for in `clampEnvOverridesForOwner()` (session-routes.ts), so both are clamped there
+for a non-granted owner in multi-user mode. None of this matters in single-user mode.
 
 ## Exact-id pinning: why `--resume`, not just `--continue`
 

src/utils/omp-session-resolver.ts

@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ export function mangleOmpWorkingDir(workingDir: string): string {
   return relative.replace(/\//g, '-');
 }
 
-/** `~/.omp` — no known env override exists (unlike DSH_HOME); revisit if omp adds one. */
+/**
+ * `~/.omp` — omp's own env overrides are mostly `PI_*` (shared with pi mode, already
+ * allowlisted in schemas.ts), and `PI_CONFIG_DIR` in particular can move this root.
+ * That is not honored here: a session with a redirected `PI_CONFIG_DIR` silently
+ * degrades pinning/history to omp's own ambiguous `--continue` instead of erroring,
+ * a known gap (found in Ark0N/Codeman#353 review) shared with pi and not fixed here.
+ */
 function resolveOmpHome(): string {
   return join(homedir(), '.omp');
 }

src/web/routes/session-routes.ts

@@ -399,10 +399,10 @@ export const _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner = clampExternalCliBypassForOwner;
 
 /**
  * Env-var keys a non-granted owner must not be able to set, because each one
- * hands back privilege the config clamp above just removed — or, for the last,
+ * hands back privilege the config clamp above just removed, or redirects a
- * redirects a credential the server injects.
+ * credential-resolution endpoint.
  *
- * All are DeepSeek's, and all are reachable because `DSH_*` and `DEEPSEEK_*` are
+ * The DeepSeek three are reachable because `DSH_*` and `DEEPSEEK_*` are
  * allowlisted `envOverrides` prefixes (schemas.ts) — which they have to be, since
  * that is also how a user configures the harness's non-privileged knobs.
  *
@@ -419,8 +419,24 @@ export const _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner = clampExternalCliBypassForOwner;
  *   URL would have the operator's API key sent as a bearer credential to a host
  *   of their choosing. (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` itself stays overridable: supplying
  *   your OWN key removes privilege rather than granting it.)
+ * - `OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL`/`OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN` are where omp resolves
+ *   credentials from — the same shape as `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL` above, reachable
+ *   because `OMP_*` is an allowlisted prefix. Unlike DeepSeek, Codeman does not
+ *   forward any operator-held key into an omp pane today (omp's provider
+ *   credentials live in `~/.omp` config files, not env vars), so there is no
+ *   known concrete exfiltration path yet — clamped defensively anyway, since a
+ *   non-granted owner redirecting where a shared multi-tenant deployment
+ *   resolves auth from is not something to allow silently (found in
+ *   Ark0N/Codeman#353 review; omp's own knobs are otherwise mostly `PI_*`,
+ *   already allowlisted for pi and not addressed here — see resolveOmpHome()).
  */
-const OWNER_CLAMPED_ENV_KEYS = ['DSH_PERMISSION_MODE', 'DSH_HOME', 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL'] as const;
+const OWNER_CLAMPED_ENV_KEYS = [
+  'DSH_PERMISSION_MODE',
+  'DSH_HOME',
+  'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL',
+  'OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL',
+  'OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN',
+] as const;
 
 /**
  * Env-var half of the multi-user bypass clamp.

test/omp-mode.test.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { describe, expect, it, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 import { CreateSessionSchema, QuickStartSchema } from '../src/web/schemas.js';
 import { buildSpawnCommand } from '../src/tmux-manager.js';
 import { defaultDockerCommandForMode } from '../src/docker-hosts.js';
 import { defaultRemoteCommandForMode } from '../src/remote-hosts.js';
 import { isExternalCliMode, isAltScreenStripMode } from '../src/session.js';
+import { _clampEnvOverridesForOwner } from '../src/web/routes/session-routes.js';
 
 describe('OMP mode schemas', () => {
   it('accepts OMP session creation config', () => {
@@ -132,3 +133,33 @@ describe('OMP mode gates', () => {
     expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('omp')).toBe('exec "${SHELL:-/bin/sh}" -i -l -c \'omp\'');
   });
 });
+
+describe('OMP multi-user clamp: the env-var half', () => {
+  // Unlike DeepSeek, omp has no permission FLAG or CONFIG for the clamp to
+  // gate (buildOmpCommand() only ever emits --model/--resume/--continue), so
+  // the only privilege surface is the two credential-resolution env vars the
+  // OMP_* prefix admits.
+  const ORIGINAL = process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = '1';
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (ORIGINAL === undefined) delete process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
+    else process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = ORIGINAL;
+  });
+
+  it('strips OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL and OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN, leaving unrelated overrides alone', async () => {
+    const out = await _clampEnvOverridesForOwner('nobody', {
+      OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL: 'https://attacker.example/broker',
+      OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN: 'stolen-token',
+      OMP_PROFILE: 'default',
+    });
+    expect(out).toEqual({ OMP_PROFILE: 'default' });
+  });
+
+  it('is a no-op in single-user mode', async () => {
+    delete process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
+    const input = { OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL: 'https://attacker.example/broker' };
+    expect(await _clampEnvOverridesForOwner(undefined, input)).toBe(input);
+  });
+});